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Glossary
TERM DEFINITION
CDP A not-for-profit organisation that collects environmental information from companies 
annually. Formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project.
Cefic European Chemical Industry Council
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CEPI Confederation of European Paper Industries
COP Conference of the Parties – Part of the UNFCCC negotiating process between 
nation states
CSR Corporate social responsibility
EU European Union
EUROFER The European Steel Association
Eurometaux European Association of Metals
ETS Emissions Trading System
FuelsEurope Trade Association established to represent the interests of refining companies 
operating within the EU. Formerly known as EUROPIA
GHG emissions Greenhouse Gas emissions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NGO A non-governmental organisation (e.g. Friends of the Earth)
n.d. No date – denotes that cited evidence is online, and no publication date has been 
given
OGP The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development
A note on style: Within the report, any cited evidence in double quotation marks are direct quotes 
from interviews we conducted. Single quotation marks indicated we have quoted a document, website, 
report or news article.
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Climate change has been recognised as one of the greatest challenges of the 
21st Century. Its impacts, and they way that we choose to deal with them will 
profoundly affect how business and society operates. This report focuses on 
European Union (EU) climate policy – the governance structures, rules and 
regulations that have been put in place at the EU level to attempt to mitigate 
and adapt to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, it focuses on how 
trade associations representing industrial sectors or broader business interests 
have lobbied on EU climate policy, and the impact that they have had on the 
policymaking process. The report then goes on to discuss whether the impacts of 
this lobbying align with the stated policies of the companies that are members of 
these trade associations.
EU climate policy is important; policy set in Brussels impacts on an important 
trade bloc of 28 member states. The EU has also acted as an international leader 
on climate policy, which other national and regional governments have used as 
a template for developing policy – for example, in the establishment of the EU 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Key climate policies have and are being 
decided at the EU level, including reforms to the EU ETS; the long-term targets 
the EU is adopting on emission reductions, energy efficiency and the proportion 
of power generated by renewables in 2030; and in other key areas such as the 
extraction of shale gas and the allocation of emissions permits granted to heavy 
industry in the EU.
Research Methods
We drew upon a number of sources to create this report. This included responses 
submitted by trade associations to two key consultations on prominent EU policy 
debates which took place between December 2012 and July 2013. For both 
consultations, submitted responses are publicly available on the European 
Commission website:
• The consultation on the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies (European Commission, 2013a)
• The consultation on structural options to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading 
System (European Commission, 2013b)
Executive Summary 
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy4
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy5
We undertook 10 interviews with staff at trade associations, campaigners at 
environmental NGOs, representatives of large investment organisations, an 
electric utility company and a former assistant to an MEP.  We reviewed the 
websites of prominent trade associations and companies, and information that 
had been voluntarily disclosed by trade associations in the EU Transparency 
Register1. We drew upon the CDP database of self-reported responses from 
companies to the CDP annual climate change information request in 2013 and 
20142, and read academic articles, grey literature, and news articles.
We have particularly focused on eight trade associations in this report. They are:
1. BUSINESSEUROPE;
2. Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI);
3. EURELECTRIC;
4. EUROFER – The European Steel Association;
5. Eurometaux – The European Association of Metals;
6. European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic);
7. FuelsEurope (formerly known as EUROPIA);
8. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP).
These groups were chosen on the basis of their prominence, and their recent 
activity in the public climate change dialogue at the EU level. 
Findings
Climate policy matters to business.
This report finds that climate change matters to businesses; the latest IPCC report 
and other evidence clearly lays out the severe consequences of climate change 
for the global economy. Businesses acknowledge that they face a number of 
risks from climate change: from physical risks to operations, reputational risks 
and (significantly for this research) the risk of regulation related to climate 
change. The research also suggests that forward looking businesses can create 
opportunities for new products and services from climate change. EU climate 
policy is therefore clearly a material concern for many businesses. 
1 We also utilised Lobbyfacts.EU – a website which draws upon the information disclosed in the Register, and 
assembles it in an easily accessible manner.
2 CDP is an international, not-for-profit organisation backed (in 2014) by 767 investors worth over $92 trillion. 
It requests standardised climate change, water and forest information from some of the world’s largest listed 
companies through annual questionnaires sent on behalf of institutional investors that endorse them as ‘CDP 
signatories’.  CDP offices around the world target the largest companies in their country or region with the 
climate change information request – for example, the largest 500 companies in Japan, and the largest 100 
companies in Central and Eastern Europe. The dataset produced by CDP contains a range of self-reported 
quantitative and qualitative data from 2,323 companies that reported to CDP between February and June 
2013 (including 403 of the Global 500 – the largest 500 companies in the world) and 2,292 companies that 
reported to CDP in 2014 (including 411 companies in the Global 500).
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Businesses use trade associations to lobby on climate policy.
Data voluntarily reported by companies and collected by CDP shows that of 
all the mechanisms available to them, businesses most frequently use trade 
associations to influence climate policy. The CDP data shows that 61% of all 
companies responding to CDP, and 77% of the largest 500 companies in the 
world, said that they utilised trade associations to lobby on climate policy. We 
found from interviews that companies derive a number of benefits from being 
members of trade associations, including:
• Trade associations represent the ‘voice of business’, or of particular industrial 
sectors, and act as a convenient, accessible aggregator of opinion for 
those sectors. Policymakers tend to give greater weight to the views of 
trade associations than they do to individual companies; trade associations 
often claim to represent tens or hundreds of thousands of jobs, and a large 
percentage share of particular markets, and are perceived to have a more 
impartial perspective than particular companies.
• Trade associations allow companies to utilise their specialist knowledge and 
contacts in policy arenas (like the EU) where they may not have the expertise 
or resources to lobby effectively.
• Companies may represent the trade association at meetings with 
policymakers, and second members of staff to trade associations to put 
forward their views
• Trade associations provide a forum for information sharing and discussion 
with both trade association officials and other companies.
Among all of the different groups that we interviewed (including representatives 
from trade associations, NGOs, an investor, a utility company and a former 
assistant to an MEP) there was a consensus that trade associations can be very 
impactful lobbyists on climate policy – depending on the issue, the history of 
the trade association and the way it organises it’s approaches to policymakers. 
Although it can be difficult to disentangle the impact of trade associations from 
other policy / political considerations, recent policy debates that European trade 
associations appear to have influenced include the 2030 framework for climate 
and energy policies, the structure of the new European Commission and the EU 
Carbon leakage provisions. 
Trade Associations use a variety of tools and mechanisms to exert influence over 
EU climate policy. 
Although it is difficult to assess how trade associations operate when much 
lobbying activity is conducted in private, the interviews we carried out (with 
representatives of trade associations and others) provided evidence of a number 
of tactics that trade associations utilise. These include:
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• Establishing key relationships and briefing policymakers;
• Shaping the policy agenda at an early stage, including pushing new policy 
initiatives and agendas within the European Commission, Parliament and 
Council of Europe;
• Utilising companies and other stakeholders to drive messages home – for 
example, through organising meetings and dinners between CEOs of large 
companies, and EU Commissioners;
• Press work, publishing open letters and adverts;
• Writing briefing papers and formal letters, and sharing information with 
policymakers and companies;
• Events involving policymakers and technical policy experts;
• Providing technical information and advice – as one representative of an 
NGO noted, “the further you get into the detail, the more technical it gets, so 
the more opportunities to lobby”;
• Trade associations may also benefit from the ‘revolving door’ between the 
public and private sector, which allows former trade association officials to be 
placed in policymaking bodies.
Trade associations for energy-intensive sectors and the fossil fuel industry utilise a 
variety of arguments to shape climate policy. 
We analysed formal responses to EU policy consultations submitted by trade 
associations on two policy areas - the EU’s 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies, and structural options to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading 
System. We also drew upon position papers and press releases on the trade 
association’s websites, news articles, and reports and commentary from third 
parties including environmental NGOs. The following arguments were used by 
trade associations representing energy-intensive sectors and broader business 
interests (eg BUSINESSEUROPE) in response to climate policy proposals:
• Arguing that the EU should not take unilateral action on climate change – 
for example, BUSINESSEUROPE ‘opposes any unilateral increase of the 
emission reduction target for 2020 unless other industrialized countries 
assume comparable emission reductions and developing countries put in place 
measures to fight climate change with their respective capacities’.
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• Raising the spectre of deindustrialisation, ‘carbon leakage’ and job losses, 
with several energy-intensive industries co-signing a letter that said ‘we are 
still too often faced with Commission initiatives that undermine our industrial 
competitiveness. Europe faces an ‘investment leakage’ trend, with new 
investments in manufacturing sectors increasingly taking place outside Europe 
notably because of the high costs of energy and climate policies.’
• Arguing that the EU had to balance climate issues against competitiveness 
and ‘re-balance’ objectives on energy supply, cost effectiveness and climate 
change.
• Requesting that subsidies for renewable energy should be ended to allow 
‘equal treatment’ for all generation methods. In addition, a few trade 
associations argued that shale gas should be exploited. For example, the 
International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) stated that ‘natural 
gas from shales is potentially an opportunity for Member States to further 
diversify their natural gas supply sources’.
• Stating that the proposed reforms of the EU Emission Trading System in 
the Commission’s report on ‘The state of the European carbon market 
in 2012’ were undesirable; BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, CEPI, EUROFER, 
Eurometaux and OGP all took positions broadly in keeping with the view that 
‘backloading’ and other structural reforms were undesirable, with CEPI calling 
on the European Commission and member states to ‘thoroughly think through 
structural changes to the EU ETS, instead of a short term fix.’
• Proposing that a single GHG emissions target should be agreed by member 
states for the EU 2030 climate and energy framework, with an end to energy 
efficiency and renewable energy targets seen in the EU 2020 framework.
• Supporting the completion of the internal EU energy market. 
It should be noted that not all trade associations utilised these sorts of arguments; 
for example, EURELECTRIC (the association for the electricity industry) argued 
in favour of ‘an economy-wide 2030 emissions reduction target of at least 
40% compared to 1990’ and said that ‘showing the world that the EU remains 
committed to a long-term strategy of driving carbon reduction through a strong 
ETS is crucial to securing a global level playing field in climate action.’
Member companies need to assess if the positions of their trade associations are 
undermining their own stance on climate change.
Investor and civil society actors have recently expressed concerns about 
misalignment between companies and their trade associations on climate policy. 
They have argued that direct lobbying by companies, and their indirect lobbying 
via trade associations, is undermining the long-term economic security and 
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value of those companies in favour of short-term policy wins. All of the trade 
associations profiled in this report had publicly available statements about their 
commitment to dealing with climate change, but NGOs and others expressed 
scepticism about the depth of this commitment. A solution to the problem of 
corporates offering a ‘fractured’, unaligned or contradictory voice on climate 
change has been calls from NGOs and UN agencies for companies to align their 
sustainability policies with their lobbying activities – in part by better managing 
the trade associations who lobby on their behalf. 
It is also interesting to note that some companies are members of trade 
associations lobbying in the EU on climate policy, but are also members of high-
profile sustainability initiatives. For example, BASF are a member of CEFIC – the 
trade association that rejected the need for ‘backloading’ of the EU Emissions 
Trading System. They are also members of the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a ‘CEO-led organization of forward-thinking 
companies that galvanizes the global business community to create a sustainable 
future for business, society and the environment.’
How trade associations collate their members’ views
Trade associations are structured in a variety of different ways, and the 
mechanisms they use to represent their members vary a great deal. Many trade 
associations seem to adopt broad, less-specific policy positions in order to get 
near to consensus, but companies may still express dissent in a number of ways 
– including internal discussion within trade association working groups; publicly 
stating the difference between their position and the trade association; and 
briefing against the trade association or leaking documents.
Both NGOs and the investor we interviewed criticised some trade associations 
for over-reaching their remit and only representing a narrow section of members 
in opposing climate policy, although trade associations repeatedly emphasised 
that their policies and lobbying were all led by demand from, and with input 
from, member companies. The dominance of large, powerful and influential 
companies within trade associations was acknowledged by trade associations, 
NGOs and investors.
Conclusions
Climate change presents a range of risks and opportunities for businesses, 
including those presented by the introduction of policies to mitigate climate 
change, and robust regulation of polluting companies. Companies operating 
in the EU have recognised that trade associations can be a powerful tool for 
influencing policymakers, and are utilising them to engage with EU climate 
policy. It is clear from the CDP data that for better or worse, companies and their 
trade associations are actively engaging with policymakers to try and mould EU 
climate policy.
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In particular, the energy-intensive industry lobbies, producers of fossil fuels and 
broad-based trade associations (such as BUSINESSEUROPE) are all actively 
engaging with policymakers on various climate policy issues, utilising a range of 
arguments about competitiveness and the risk of ‘carbon leakage’ – and these 
trade associations are having an impact on issues including the targets in the EU 
2030 climate and energy  framework, the carbon leakage allowances and even 
the structure of the European Commission.
The important role of companies in European climate policy is unlikely to change 
any time soon. As CDP recently stated, ‘Like it or not, the strong role of corporate 
influence in political decision-making is a reality.’ (Levick, 2014). Given the huge 
challenges posed to the EU and countries around the world by climate change, it 
is most important to ensure that progressive companies are pushing for effective 
climate policies that help to mitigate the effects of climate change. As Christiana 
Figueres, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, stated in 2011 while addressing a business audience: “There 
is a serious group of companies that have a voice that is much louder, that is 
better funded, and that operates much more in unison and that is still stuck in 
the technologies and the fuels of yesterday... From our perspective what we 
really need from visionary companies such as all of you is to have a very active 
engagement with the policymakers who decide the policy at home and the 
international policy” (Figueres, 2011). This puts the onus back onto companies 
(and the investors that own them) to ensure that the trade associations that they 
are supporting are lobbying on EU climate policy in a way that is clearly aligned 
with the long-term interests of those companies, the economy and the climate.
Future research topics
Useful topics to explore in greater depth include:
• Research into the positions and direct influence of large multinational 
companies on EU climate policy would be useful. 
• Alignment of companies with the lobbying activities conducted by their trade 
associations could usefully be investigated in far greater depth. 
• The influence of businesses and their trade associations on national 
governments, who in turn influence EU climate policy.
• Research into many more other groups (beyond the 8 trade associations 
profiled here) whose positions and influence on EU climate policy could be 
usefully investigated.
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1 Introduction and  
Research Methods
Climate change has been recognised as one of the greatest challenges of the 
21st Century (Stern, 2007). The world is at a crossroads in terms of the action 
that will be taken to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change; 
preparations are currently underway for the 21st UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP) at the end of 2015, which 
many hope will lead to a global climate deal. The impact and effectiveness of a 
global deal, as well as regional and national policies on climate change will be 
determined by the willingness of government, business and society to act. 
This report focuses on how businesses and their trade associations are affecting 
EU climate policy. Europe is particularly important in international climate 
negotiations; the EU is an important player in global negotiations, and Europe 
is frequently cited as a leader on climate change, with policymakers looking to 
Europe as a template for climate policy. Key climate policies have and are being 
decided at the EU level, including reforms to the EU Emissions Trading System; 
the long-term targets the EU is adopting on emission reductions, energy efficiency 
and the proportion of power generated by renewables in 2030; and in other key 
areas such as shale gas and the allocation of emissions permits granted to heavy 
industry in the EU.
The research questions that this project sought to answer was ‘how do trade 
associations influence EU climate policy? And how well do trade associations 
represent the views of their member companies on EU climate policy?’ The 
research also explored why climate change matters to businesses; the positions 
trade associations are putting forward in response to climate policy; and how 
trade associations collate their members’ views.
To answer these questions, we drew upon a number of sources to create this 
report, including:
• Conducting 5 qualitative, semi-structured interviews with staff at trade 
associations;
• Conducting 5 qualitative, semi-structured  interviews with policy-focused 
campaigners at environmental NGOs, representatives of large investment 
organisations, an electric utility company and a former assistant to an MEP;
• Reviewing the websites of prominent trade associations;
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• Reviewing the websites and CSR reports of companies that are members of 
the surveyed trade associations;
• Reviewing information that has been voluntarily disclosed by trade 
associations in the EU Transparency Register3;
• Analysing the CDP database of self-reported responses from companies to the 
CDP annual climate change information request in 2013 and 20144;
• Reading relevant academic and grey literature;
• Reviewing online news articles.
We also examined responses submitted by trade associations to two key 
consultations on prominent policy debates which took place between December 
2012 and July 2013, which are publicly available on the European Commission 
website:
• The consultation on the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies (European Commission, 2013a)
• The consultation on structural options to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading 
System (European Commission, 2013b)
We have profiled key trade associations in Chapter 6 of this report. These are:
1. BUSINESSEUROPE; 
2. Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI);
3. EURELECTRIC;
4. EUROFER – The European Steel Association;
5. Eurometaux – The European Association of Metals;
6. European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic);
7. FuelsEurope (formerly known as EUROPIA);
8. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP).
These groups were chosen on the basis of their prominence and their recent 
activity in the public climate change dialogue at the EU level. 
3 We also utilised Lobbyfacts.EU – a website which draws upon the information disclosed in the Register, and assembles 
it in an easily accessible manner.
4 CDP is an international, not-for-profit organization backed by 767 investors worth over $92 trillion. It requests 
standardized climate change, water and forest information from some of the world’s largest listed companies through 
annual questionnaires sent on behalf of institutional investors that endorse them as ‘CDP signatories’.  CDP offices 
around the world target the largest companies in their country or region with the climate change information request – 
for example, the largest 500 companies in Japan, and the largest 100 companies in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
dataset produced by CDP contains a range of self-reported quantitative and qualitative data from 2,323 companies that 
reported to CDP between February and June 2013 (including 403 of the Global 500 – the largest 500 companies in 
the world) and 2,292 companies that reported to CDP in 2014 (including 411 companies in the Global 500).
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There is a clear consensus that effective policies will be needed to mitigate 
dangerous climate change, and that a global average temperature rise of above 
2°C could have severe consequences for the global climate and economic 
system. The fifth assessment report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change – which has been approved by 194 governments – states that without 
additional efforts, greenhouse gas emissions are expected to increase, driven 
by growth in global population and economic activities. On current trends, this 
would result in an increase in global mean surface temperature in 2100 from 
3.7°C to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC, 2014, p9). The Stern 
Review outlined some of the consequences of temperature increases at these 
levels, which includes increased flood risk, rising sea levels but also reduced 
water supplies; declining crop yields; increased risk of cold-related deaths 
in northern latitudes, and increased deaths from malnutrition and heat stress 
worldwide, and severe threats to ecosystems which includes 15-40% of species 
being threatened with extinction (Stern, 2007, p. vi).
2.1 Risks to business models
Leading businesses are increasingly aware of the risks to their business models 
posed by these climate risks. For example, British food and drinks retailer ASDA 
recently reported that 95% of its fresh produce would be affected by changes in 
the climate throughout its supply chain, and stated that ’whether food sourcing, 
processing or transportation, there is a risk to all aspects of our operations – 
just how much this could be is well into the millions of pounds’ (ASDA, 2014). 
Of the largest 500 companies in the world responding to CDP in 2013, 83% 
stated that they faced physical impacts on their operations from climate change 
(CDP, 2013, p10). Some businesses are also recognising the market failures that 
disguise the broader environmental impact of their operations; Puma’s pioneering 
environmental profit and loss account (Puma, 2012), showed that the company 
and its suppliers were estimated to have caused €145m of environmental 
damage that year, relative to the €202m net profit that the company recorded in 
2009/2010. The Financial Times noted that ’in other words, if Puma expensed 
the costs to the environment of its activities and those of its suppliers, earnings 
would fall by more than two-thirds’ (McGinn, 2013).
2 Why climate change 
matters to businesses
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2.2 Risks from regulation
Not all businesses, however, are concerned about climate change because of 
its direct impact on their operations. Some are more worried about the impact 
of government and transnational regulation of their operations; 84% of the 
largest global 500 companies reporting to CDP stated that they faced a risk 
from regulation related to climate change (CDP, 2013). These regulations could 
severely impact on fossil fuel and energy-intensive industries. In 2014, a financial 
services firm stated ’A 450-ppm world would threaten high-cost, high-carbon 
revenues. Under a global climate deal consistent with a 2°C world, we estimate 
that the fossil-fuel industry would stand to lose $28trn (in constant 2012 US 
dollars) of gross revenues over the next two decades, compared with business as 
usual’ (Kepler Cheuvreux, 2014). 
The risk to business from policy action at the local, national, or international level 
is well documented in both the EU and further afield. In their book ‘Business and 
Environmental Policy’, Kraft and Kamieniecki state that 
’It is conventional wisdom that business groups are often leading players in the 
policymaking process. Why would one expect anything else? After all, businesses 
can be affected in significant and costly ways by public policy, from provisions 
of tax laws to regulations on environmental protection… Business interests clearly 
have a great deal at stake when government considers taking action, and many 
have the resources to intervene as needed to shape policy decisions.’ 
(Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2007, pp. ix-x). 
2.3 Opportunities from a changing climate
Some businesses may see climate policy not as a risk, but as an opportunity. 
Ceres (2010) describes how businesses are recognising the opportunity to profit 
from technologies that reduce emissions and create solutions to global warming 
- and some of these companies are actively calling upon governments at the 
national and global level to implement comprehensive climate policy, in the hope 
of opening up new opportunities and markets. The report states that 
’Enormous opportunities arise during transformative times. The $6 trillion 
energy industry – six times larger than the Internet economy – must be retooled 
to minimize energy use and to achieve a substantially lower carbon footprint. 
Clean, energy-efficient technologies will power economies for decades to come, 
and businesses that put themselves out in front will benefit the most. Companies 
with products and services attuned to the new economy will emerge as winners’ 
(Ceres, 2010). 
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The sentiments outlined by Ceres are also reflected in the seminal New Climate 
Economy report, ‘Better Growth, Better Climate’ (Global Commission on the 
Economy and Climate, 2014a), which provides evidence on the opportunities 
for growing the world’s economy whilst addressing climate change. Former 
President of Mexico and Chair of the Global Commission on the Economy 
and Climate, Felipe Calderón, said the report provides ’compelling evidence 
on how technological change is driving new opportunities to improve growth, 
create jobs, boost company profits and spur economic development’ (Global 
Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014b). Similarly, CDP and WWF 
(2013) details how businesses that have made efforts to reduce their emissions 
throughout their supply chains, and that have taken into account the growing 
demand from consumers for sustainable products and services, have yielded 
significant returns on investment and important reputational benefits.
2.4 Reputational risk, litigation, and citizen and shareholder 
campaigns
Businesses may also decide to support or oppose action on climate change 
due to perceived moral obligations or societal concerns. Ceres describes how 
a growing number of companies are asserting leadership on sustainability 
performance to distinguish themselves from their peers, and outlines the 
importance of companies responding to societal expectations: ’Just as sound 
business decisions must be based on science it is also important for companies 
to respond to societal expectations. …In the coming years, the strategies that 
companies pursue will determine not only their shareholder value, but also the 
future of our species and our planet. It is at once a daunting challenge and a 
huge opportunity’ (Ceres, 2010, p.7).
Companies also face other, significant risks – particularly fossil fuel industries, 
energy-intensive industries, and other sectors that will lose out from robust action 
on climate change. Analysis in an academic paper that attributed two-thirds 
of historic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to 90 commercial and state-
owned entities (including Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell and ConocoPhillips) 
concluded that 
’Regulation, litigation, and shareholder actions targeted at the private entities 
responsible for tobacco-related diseases played a significant role in the history 
of tobacco control; one could imagine comparable actions aimed at the private 
entities involved in the production of fossil fuels, particularly insofar as some of the 
entities included in this analysis have played a role in efforts to impede legislation 
that might slow the production and sale of carbon fuels… Identifying who the 
major carbon producers are, and have been historically, may provide a useful 
basis for future social and legal pressure’ 
(Heede, 2014).
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3 How companies engage 
with climate policy
Businesses face a number of risks and opportunities from a changing climate; 
and they are responding to this risk by engaging with the policymaking process. 
Lobbying on policy issues is, by its nature, difficult to track. While groups 
interested in influencing policy will use mechanisms that operate in the public 
sphere – for example, they may send out public statements and press releases 
which illustrate their positions – many of the mechanisms that are commonly 
used to influence policy (private meetings; sending personalised briefing papers; 
phone calls and emails) are not transparent, and are difficult to monitor. With a 
few exceptions5, this sort of information is not publicly recorded. It can therefore 
be difficult to assess the exact mechanisms that businesses and their trade 
associations are using to engage with climate policy. It can also be difficult 
to check the consistency of business and trade associations’ public stance on 
climate policy with their messages in private meetings. 
CDP6 sends out an annual climate change information request to the largest 
publicly listed companies in the world covering a variety of topics, from carbon 
emissions to adaptation strategies. In 2013 and 2014, CDP added a section 
to their questionnaire on lobbying on climate change policies. Self-reported 
information – such as that gathered by CDP – has its limitations, but can be useful 
to investigate how businesses and trade associations publicly state that they 
influence climate policy. 
3.1 How do companies lobby on climate policy?
Companies responding to CDP acknowledged that they influenced climate policy 
through a number of different avenues, with more businesses stating that they 
influenced climate policy through trade associations than any other mechanism. 
In 2014, 61% of all companies responding to CDP stated that they influenced 
climate policy indirectly through trade associations in 2014, compared to half of 
5 For example, MEPs from the UK Conservative Party publish a register of all of their meetings with lobbyists every 
quarter, with a brief description of the specific people they met, their organisation and the ‘context’ for the meeting. 
This is available at http://conservativeeurope.com/transparency, accessed on 24th October 2014.  The new European 
Commission led by President Jean-Claude Juncker committed on 25th November 2014 to disclosing meetings with 
European Commissioners, their Cabinets and the Director-Generals of the Commission services, which will include 
information on the dates, locations, and names of the organisations and individuals they have met, but these rules will 
only come into force on 1st December 2014. For more information, see the European commission press release, found 
here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2131_en.htm, accessed on 16th December 2014.
6 See footnote on p12 for more information about CDP
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the companies who engaged directly with policymakers. Less than a fifth of all 
companies that responded to CDP claimed not to influence policy processes on 
climate change in both 2013 and 2014 (Table 1). 
A higher percentage of companies in the Global 500 (the largest 500 
companies in the world7) stated that they use trade associations to make their 
views heard among policymakers (77% of responding companies in the Global 
500), when compared to the whole sample of companies responding to CDP 
(61% of all responding companies). This indicates that the largest companies are 
more frequently using trade associations to engage with policymakers on climate 
change issues.
Even these percentages of companies engaging with policy via their trade 
associations may be artificially low. When considering the US companies 
responding to CDP, the Union of Concerned Scientists note that ’many, if not most 
large companies in the United States belong to trade and business associations 
and nearly all the major groups are involved in public policy... yet many 
companies surveyed [by CDP] did not acknowledge policy influence through 
these groups – suggesting that many companies may be either unaware of, or 
unwilling to report, the climate policy influence of their trade associations’ (Union 
of Concerned Scientists, 2014, p4). When the Union of Concerned Scientists 
cross-referenced the answers provided to CDP with the publicly available 
membership of the boards of four prominent US trade associations that have 
lobbied on various aspects of policy to tackle climate change, they found that 
many companies had not disclosed their membership on the board of these 
associations (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014, p5). In all four cases under 
a third of corporates with seats on the boards who were approached by CDP 







OTHER DO NOT 
INFLUENCE
Global 500
(2013 n = 403)
(2014 n =  411)
2013 70.9% 61.5% 37.9% 34.2% 8.4%




(2014 n = 2292)
2013 52.8% 41.5% 19.9% 26.7% 17.9%
2014 60.7% 50.1% 23.5% 30.8% 16.4%
7 The Global 500 is a group constructed by Fortune Magazine, made up of the 500 largest companies in the 
world by market capitalisation. Of these 500 companies, 403 (81%) responded to CDP in 2013, and of these, 
396 opted to answer the questions on corporate lobbying. In 2014, 411 (82%) responded to CDP, of which 
400 opted to answer the questions on corporate lobbying.  For the latest Fortune 500, see http://fortune.com/
global500/, accessed on 24th October 2014.
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publicly disclosed their board membership, and in the case of the US Chamber of 
Commerce, only one company (2% of the board members approached by CDP) 
had disclosed their board membership. These lessons from the US suggest that 
the answers provided to CDP by companies operating in Europe may also be 
incomplete, and corporate engagement with climate policy via trade associations 
may well be greater than stated.
3.2 Why do businesses use trade associations to lobby on  
climate issues?
Auden Schendler, Vice President of sustainability at Aspen Skiing Company, and 
Mike Toffel, Associate Professor in the Technology and Operations Management 
unit of Harvard Business School, have voiced the opinion that effective lobbying 
represents the greatest impact that a company can have on the environment, 
stating that ’Compared with companies’ efforts to green their operations, 
corporate political actions such as lobbying or campaign funding can have 
more influence on environmental protection, and arguably represent the greatest 
impact a company can have on protecting — or harming — the environment’ 
(Schendler and Toffel, 2011). 
The responses to CDP indicate that trade associations are one of the most 
important (if not the most important) mechanism that companies use to influence 
the direction of climate policy. Trade associations play several important roles  
for companies:
Representing an industry voice
Several of the people we interviewed for this project recognised the important 
role that trade associations can play in speaking to sectoral or business 
interests. Policymakers are aware of the narrow interests that some companies 
may be pursuing when engaging with policymakers, and are likely to grant 
more authority and influence to bodies with a pan-industry perspective. One 
representative of a trade association stated “the main advantage is…we’re not 
representing a particular sector. We are representing all market participants.” 
Another said that “On the whole, the Commission likes trade associations 
because we are aggregators for them of opinion, and that saves them a lot of 
hassle. Rather than meet, say, the 20 biggest [industrial sector companies], they 
can talk to me”. Companies are aware of this; the representative of the electric 
utility company we interviewed said that individual companies are usually 
expected to be lobbying in their own interest: “So when an individual company 
will go in and speak to the Commission, [the Commission are] always aware that 
there is a very economic interest while they’re in their office speaking to them; 
so they prefer to have a lot wider collaboration and that’s much more easily 
achieved through trade organisations.”
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Allows companies the opportunity to utilise the trade association’s specialist 
knowledge, established networks and reputation in order to lobby
Setting up an effective lobbying operation in Europe can be very costly and 
time-consuming for businesses. One of our interviewees described a company 
they were familiar with, which had 80 people working on corporate affairs, 
including internal and external communications, media and public affairs. These 
staff were virtually all focused on their domestic markets, and in Brussels they 
had “one – a very lonely one” person. Trade associations can provide a cost-
effective means for companies to access key decision makers, develop contacts 
and to understand the legislative agenda in an arena that may otherwise be 
beyond their reach. One trade association representative told us that trade 
associations “have a lot of influence… I would say a huge majority of company 
lobbying is done through associations at EU level. Very few companies will do 
their own direct lobbying. Only the very big ones. So from a policy maker point 
of view, from a decision maker point of view, they will generally only see trade 
association positions and there are lots of them.”
Provides companies with the opportunity to act as representative of  
trade association
Secondments from companies to trade associations seem common; a member of 
staff at a trade association we interviewed said that “People might move from 
companies and trade associations. We’ve got at least three company people on 
secondment [here]”. This allows companies to represent their interests via their 
trade association. Companies also often hold positions on trade association 
working groups, which formulate the associations’ policy positions. This allows 
businesses to represent their views from a more credible industry perspective. 
One NGO said: “There are the permanent staff of the big trade associations and 
you know who they are but this muddling-up of who’s who is, I think … creates 
an … impression of interchangeability and industry thinks ‘X’, which can be 
advantageous to them.”
Provides a forum for information sharing and discussion
The officials working for a trade association can provide a convenient means 
of accessing information, including the overarching policy landscape and the 
technical detail of issues. A representative of a utility company we interviewed 
said that “actually a lot of the value of trade associations is not the lobbying they 
do on particular issues, it’s the technical detail.  So that’s why we’re members of 
[names of associations] because a lot of them are doing technical detail about 
market design”. Meetings organised by the trade association can also provide 
a useful forum for networking, discussion and debate. One trade association 
representative (when talking about their working groups of companies within 
their association) said “It is quite fast information exchange when someone is 
having some kind of information – so it is good to share it, next time it might 
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be someone else who is getting some important information. I think it is better 
to work together”. Trade associations can provide information even when the 
company is going against the line adopted by the association. Another trade 
association talked about working with a company that opposed the majority 
opinion of association members: “I, in order to feel I’m doing honourably by 
them… I obviously share information that’s relevant, timetable information, that 
sort of thing… in the recognition that they will go out and use it to go out and 
lobby in the opposite direction. That’s their right”.
3.3 The impact of trade associations
Across all of the people we interviewed (from trade associations, NGOs, a 
utility company and an investment organisation) the consensus was that trade 
associations can be very impactful. One representative of a trade association 
said “we’re an important voice in this discussion…and it’s a voice that’s 
appreciated by the policy makers and I’d say the Commission in particular.” 
Another added “We are a big voice.” This was reinforced by the other parties 
that we interviewed. The investor we interviewed said “I think they have 
considerable influence… The impression I get is that a few trade associations 
have a disproportionate amount of I guess input or influence”. One representative 
of an NGO acknowledged that trade associations could be effective, but 
caveated this by saying “it varies depending on the trade association, depending 
on the file, depending on the history”. 
Trade associations seem to be having a real impact on EU climate policy, with 
both trade associations and other stakeholders pointing to the impact of (in 
particular) the associations representing energy-intensive sectors and the fossil 
fuels industry. Recently this has included influencing:
• 2030 framework for climate and energy policies – One trade association 
we interviewed claimed credit for the shape of the EU 2030 targets, as 
the renewable energy and energy efficiency targets were not binding at a 
national level: “So I think there has been a real change, when we saw the 
decision, the conclusions of last Thursday that only one binding target” but 
added “so I think that message gone through not totally, because we still  
have three targets” (the renewable energy and energy efficiency targets  
were retained at a EU-wide level). Perceived low ambition on energy 
efficiency and renewables was heavily criticised by NGOs, who said the 
40% emissions reduction goal was totally inadequate, with the European 
Environmental Bureau arguing that the target is out of step with climate  
science (Flynn, 2014a).
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• Structure of the European Commission - The incoming President of the 
European Commission has made several changes to the structure of the 
Commission, including a merger of the climate and energy portfolios, 
despite an appeal from 25 MEPs to retain separate Directorate-Generals 
for these positions. In addition, he created a new role of commissioner for 
’better regulation’, stating that Frans Timmermans of the Netherlands will be 
the Commission’s ’first vice-president’ and his ’right-hand man’.  According 
to ENDS Europe, Green NGOs saw the new structure as a signal that 
environment policy will be side-lined, but industry sources welcomed the 
decision as pragmatic. Lobby groups for the steel, oil refining, metals and 
pesticides sector told ENDS they were particularly pleased by the appointment 
of Mr Timmermans, with a source at one major industry lobby group in 
Brussels stating that ’We are happy to see that growth and jobs are no longer 
overshadowed by environment and climate change’. (Davenport, 2014).
• EU Carbon leakage provisions - EU leaders agreed to change climate law 
provisions for the period after 2020 in line with energy-intensive industries’ 
concerns. EU leaders also backed energy-intensive industry’s call for allocation 
of free emissions allowances to be based on actual production rather than on 
historical levels. Future allocation will ’ensure better alignment with changing 
production levels in different sectors’, the deal states. ’This is what we have 
requested for many years, even since 2008-09’, one Brussels-based industry 
lobbyist said to ENDS Europe, adding that allocation may be adapted every 
few years in practice. According to ENDS, Metals association Eurometaux 
welcomed the deal as a ’first step towards improving the competitive position 
of Europe’s energy-intensive industries’, and particularly welcomed ’the 
Council’s clear recognition that work is required to account for our substantial 
indirect CO2 costs from the EU ETS’. The decisions were also welcomed by 
steel sector association EUROFER (Flynn, 2014b).
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In this chapter we describe the ways in which trade associations exert influence 
over EU climate policy. European trade associations exist in all shapes and sizes, 
and their activities depend, at least in part, on their size and financial resources. 
One NGO observed that a trade association can even be “one person as an 
outpost in Brussels… Almost any configurable group you can imagine has a 
trade association here”.  Whilst tactics such as the use of legal tools for blocking 
climate policy and financial contributions to politicians and civil servants are 
common in the US, some researchers have found differences between the 
adversarial culture of lobbying across the Atlantic, and the consensus-building, 
‘soft-spoken’ approach employed in the EU. US legislative proposals also have 
a far lower passage rate than their EU equivalents: Woll states about the US 
political process that ‘with a passage rate of only 11 per cent, it is indeed 
sensible not to invest too much time on modifying a proposal and to try and 
oppose it in its entirety’ (Woll, 2012). In contrast, the European Commission 
have estimated that approximately 80% or above of legislation that is proposed 
in the EU is eventually enacted (European Commission, 2007); which means 
that aggressive attempts to kill off legislation are less likely to succeed. European 
companies and trade associations therefore tend not to use the oppositional 
tactics popular in the US. As one interviewee said, “you are either a team 
player, or you leave town.” For this reason trade associations tend to utilise 
direct lobbying, coalitions with companies and input of expert opinion to shape 
proposals and policy measures.
4.1 Establishing key relationships and briefing policymakers
Trade associations see relationships with key policymakers as critical in shaping 
the policy agenda. One told us that, of current Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), “there are 750-ish of them. Of whom about a tenth know 
anything about energy or climate or environment, and of those people about 
one third of them are heavyweights. So actually there’s about 25 of them who 
really matter – these are the coordinators, the chairmen, the National delegation 
heads, the experts who are…the rapporteurs… I would personally consider 
myself a pretty crappy lobbyist if I didn’t have the mobile phone numbers of all 
those MEPs, if I didn’t know exactly where their offices were, and if I wasn’t in 
email contact with them on a pretty regular basis.” Another simply said “I think 
that the general way of doing this lobbying is that if you meet people and if you 
know someone better, it is good”.
 
Trade associations frequently highlighted the importance of one-to-one (or small 
group) private meetings to brief policymakers. One suggested that “the most 
effective way is to have one-to-one meetings and just explaining what the issue 
is, highlighting the type of discussion we’ve had within our membership… It is 
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useful for the policy makers to hear discussions we’ve had internally, and then 
how we’ve reached the position we got to”. Some trade associations considered 
the importance of informal relationship building: “You might just have an informal 
coffee just to discuss everyone’s understanding… this would not be a formal 
meeting but a chat.” 
4.2 Shaping the policy agenda at an early stage
“Clearly, the most influential thing you can possibly do is be in at the start of 
saying to the Commission, ‘Look, we think you’ve got a policy gap here, we’d 
like you to do something about it and here’s some of our suggestions.’” In this 
manner trade associations may seek to influence not just policy proposals but the 
policy agenda itself, before policy options are being considered. A contributor 
with knowledge of European Parliamentary process said that “all climate 
environment laws that get passed have input…from trade associations… that’s 
their business, their main business; the Commission – before they even make their 
proposal – they will run a consultation phase and they will engage with trade 
associations, so it’s institutionalised; and then it’s up to the trade associations then 
how much they engage during the negotiations themselves.”
4.3 Utilising companies and other stakeholders to drive  
messages home
Another mechanism for exerting influence is the use of trade associations’ 
member companies. In 2010, Greenpeace noted that Cefic brought in the CEOs 
and Presidents of BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, ExxonMobil, Procter & Gamble, 
Rhodia, Solvay and Shell to lobby Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard 
directly on a proposed increase in the EU emissions reduction target. Energy 
Commissioner Günther Oettinger was very receptive to the industry and joined 
its opposition to the new target. He even adopted the industry’s language: ‘If we 
go alone to 30%, you will only have a faster process of deindustrialisation in 
Europe.’ (Greenpeace, 2011)
Our interviews confirmed the use of these tactics: “What we sometimes do 
is that we go and meet the MEPs with a small delegation of our members” 
said one, and another noted the variety of ways they utilise the influence of 
companies: “We do indeed bring them in as lobbyists. You know, we’ve had 
CEO debate panels in Parliament, we’ve had CEOs come in and have dinners 
with Commissioners, and dinners with key MEPs ahead of key decisions etc. 
etc.” These tactics are effective; one NGO observed that “if it’s a Danish MEP 
you’re talking to then a Danish company which is a member of your association 
can go talk to them in the name of the association so it gives you quite a broad 
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reach and an affinity with people you’re talking to.” Depending on the political 
persuasion of MEPs, other groups, such as trade unions, may also be brought in 
to discuss issues.
4.4 Working with policymakers to swing votes and influence 
decisions
Trade associations are not always working solely to influence policymakers; 
sometimes they work alongside policymaker allies to advance particular 
policies. One trade association described working with a Directorate-General 
of the Commission to try to put pressure on other players in the Commission 
“[one Directorate-General] wanted that, they couldn’t get it past Commissioner 
Oettinger in the Commission College, we arranged that we would hit them 
hard the day the news came out by saying ‘this is great, but…’”. They added 
“the closer to closing a legislative deal that you get… the more time intensive 
lobbying becomes… [we may be] in contact ten times a day in the build-up to a 
crucial vote”.
4.5 Press work
Press work carried out by trade associations may be particularly high profile 
in the run-up to key decisions. One NGO representative talked about how “in 
particular the steel industry has been very visible with its statements. They had a 
letter and they had advertisements, including in the Financial Times for instance, 
where they have been asking for a continuation of free allocation of emissions 
allowances to the steel industry but also to other energy-intensive sectors.” Major 
trade associations including Cefic, CEPI, EUROFER, Eurometaux and OGP all put 
out press statements, position papers or public letters on the EU 2030 emission 
reduction target and other 2030 targets in the run-up to the October 2014 
meeting that decided the final agreed targets. Despite this, trade associations 
talked about limits to their ability to use the press to reach a broad audience: 
“I wouldn’t say it’s the wider public, it’s still people who have an interest in our 
work.” Another talked about the limitations of pro-active press work: 
“That starts off as a one-way channel: [trade association] puts out a press release, 
frankly who cares, but when it goes to the point where something is happening 
within the political world, and all the carbon market journalists want quotes, 
or want to know what’s going on in more detail, they start phoning you. And 
some of that I do on the record and an awful lot I do off the record, background 
briefing, because there’s no point in quoting [trade association representative] 
every week – that gets boring. Much more effective that I say, this is the story, this 
is the guy you should go to for the best quote.”
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4.6 Writing briefing papers and formal letters, and sharing 
information
All of the trade associations we spoke to acknowledged the importance of 
putting together formal statements and position papers, with one going so far 
as to say “I would also say that some, most, of my colleagues are much less 
lobbying that they are writers of position papers.” Timing and the importance of 
policy items determines when formal position papers are formulated: “There is 
no point in sending letters during the year just for fun, but really when it is near 
to…a decision”. Formal position papers and statements are developed alongside 
private meetings with policymakers. Emphasising the importance of being directly 
sent briefing materials, an interviewee formerly employed in an MEP’s office said 
that “We wouldn’t look at their press releases. We wouldn’t go online to look 
unless we were very, very interested. So we only see what gets pushed to us.” 
4.7 Events
A former aide to an MEP said “in terms of actual tactics I think that events are quite 
effective because you give decision makers a platform to speak and you’re there 
as a captive audience for a couple of hours.” They stated that invitations to events 
like these are likely only to go to ‘insiders’ and such events are often held in the 
Parliament “behind closed doors”. Friends of the Earth and Corporate European 
Observatory (2014) highlight an event organised by BUSINESSEUROPE on 7th 
November 2013 where the CEOs of Arcelor-Mittal, BASF, Bayer, GDF-Suez and 
others spent the day in discussions and panel debates with Commission President 
Barroso and other high-level officials, including two Commissioners and the 
Directors General of DG Enterprise, Clima (climate), Environment and Energy. The 
day ended with networking over cocktails and dinner.
4.8 Providing technical information and advice
Woll (2012) notes that instead of using confrontational tactics with public 
officials, European lobbyists typically gain access through expert consultations, 
and states that advising the European Commission on technical policy matters 
has ’proven to be the most common and most successful mode of participation of 
societal actors of all kinds’. An NGO agreed: “the further you get into the detail 
the more technical it gets, so the more opportunities to lobby.” In November 
2014, trade unions and transparency groups released a report (ETUC, 2014) 
criticising the ‘persistent over-representation of corporate interests’ in European 
Commission expert groups8, pointing out that in the Secretariat-General, over 
73% of ‘independent’ experts are actually directly linked to big business interests 
(ETUC, EPSI, UNI Global Union & Corporate Europe Observatory, 2014).
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This lobbying can take a variety of forms, from providing briefing papers 
to being an expert witness at hearings in the European Parliament. Trade 
associations can also commission and provide the evidence on which decisions 
are based; one representative of an NGO said that 
“I was working on fluorinated greenhouse gases and this touches a number 
of different industries and the industry association for the F-gas manufacturers 
was represented… They had a lot of data, they sponsored studies, they were 
networked internationally with their companies… that was a completely different 
order of lobbying…  When policy-makers need to know something about an 
industry to actually design a policy then the industry is at its most effective as 
they know the information and the degree to which they can come across as 
credible… they would be by and large able to steer the direction of that policy 
for quite a long time.”
4.9 The ‘revolving door’ between the public and private sector
NGOs have drawn attention to the ‘revolving door’ between the public and 
private sector, which may also increase the influence of trade associations. 
An example of this is one official (cited in Friends of the Earth and Corporate 
European Observatory, 2014) who first worked for the European Commission’s 
DG Enterprise and Industry between 2007-2010 in the area of industrial policy 
and carbon dioxide emissions from cars. He then moved to BUSINESSEUROPE, 
with specific responsibility for climate change. The official then returned to the 
Commission in 2011 as a Policy Officer in DG Energy, where he worked  
on the Energy 2050 Roadmap and subsequently on the 2030 Climate and 
Energy package.
8 Expert groups are consultative bodies that advise the Commission on the preparation of legislative proposals 
and policy initiatives, the implementation of legislation, programmes and existing Union policies, and the 
preparation of delegated acts. The European Commission states that the “Commission and its services remain 
fully independent with regard to taking into account the views expressed by expert groups” (http://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/internal_market/expert-groups/index_en.htm, accessed 17th December 2014)
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The efforts required to keep the increase in global average temperature below 
2°C will be substantial. According to the IPCC, ’Scenarios reaching atmospheric 
concentration levels of about 450ppm CO2eq by 2100 (consistent with a likely 
chance to keep temperature change below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels) 
include substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG emissions by mid-century through 
large-scale changes in energy systems and potentially land use’ (IPCC, 2014, 
p13). The recently-released New Climate Economy Report states that the next 
15 years of investment will determine the future of the world’s climate system, 
and that without stronger action in the next 10-15 years, it is near certain that 
global average warming will exceed 2°C – the level the international community 
has agreed not to cross –with ’extreme and potentially irreversible impacts’ (The 
Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014). 
The EU is a major international player and has consistently shown leadership 
on climate policy. The policies that trade associations support or oppose in 
Europe can therefore have far-reaching consequences for transitioning the global 
economy to a more sustainable model, and for the mitigation of climate change. 
In order to explore the specific detail of the policies that trade associations were 
supporting or opposing, we selected some prominent trade associations that had 
responded to two consultations. These were:
TRADE ASSOCIATION NUMBER OF 
LOBBYISTS




Cefic: European Chemical 
Industry Council
75 15 €6,000,000
BUSINESSEUROPE 27 21 €4,000,000 - €4,250,000
International Association of Oil 




8 6 €1,500,000 - €1,750,000
FuelsEurope (formerly EUROPIA) 6 4 €400,000 - €450,000
Eurelectric 7 6 €350,000 - €400,000
Confederation of European Paper 
Industries (CEPI)
9 4 €300,000 - €350,000
EUROFER: The European Steel 
Association
1 0 €250,000 - €300,000
Table 2: List of trade associations profiled in this report. All information in this table is self-reported by the associations 
via the EU Transparency Register, and is for the most recently reported year (as of 16th December 2014).
9 The website for the European Transparency Register states that individuals on the Transparency Register 
may be granted access rights to the European Parliament for up to 12 months. Individuals with access rights 
may obtain a daily access card to enter the European Parliament from the reception desks in Brussels and 
Strasbourg. For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/info/consult-register/
requestEp.do?locale=en accessed on 16th December 2014.
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Below we profile and categorise responses from sampled trade associations to 
two European Commission consultations on significant pieces of climate policy:
• The consultation on the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and 
energy policies, which was open for submissions from 28th March 2013 to 
2nd July 2013 (European Commission, 2013a);
• The consultation on structural options to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading 
System which was open for submissions from 7th December 2012 to 28th 
February 2013 (European Commission, 2013b).
 
These publicly disclosed consultation responses provided us with a comparable 
group of written statements by prominent trade associations, all submitted within 
the same timeframe. To supplement these, we drew upon position papers and 
press releases on the trade association’s websites, news articles, and reports and 
commentary from third parties including environmental NGOs.
5.1 The EU should not take unilateral action on climate 
change.
Many of the trade associations – particularly those in energy-intensive 
sectors – argued that the EU should not take unilateral action on 
climate change, and that emissions reduction targets should only 
be increased in the case of similar commitments from the EU’s 
major trading partners. Greenpeace notes that after the failure of 
the Copenhagen climate negotiations, ‘carbon-intensive companies 
in Europe were clear on the next steps. With a letter to the heads 
of EU institutions in January 2010, a business coalition – spearheaded by the 
European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic), the European Confederation of 
Iron and Steel Industries (EUROFER) and BUSINESSEUROPE – insisted that the 
EU refrain from taking a global leadership position on climate change, rejecting 
any further progressive action.’ (Greenpeace, 2011). Trade associations such as 
Cefic have used the relative size of Europe’s emissions compared to total global 
emissions to argue that pursuing an ambitious carbon target would penalise the 
region disproportionately in return for relatively little environmental benefit.  In 
their consultation responses, BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, CEPI, EUROFER, and 
Eurometaux all commented on the need for an international climate agreement 
and indicated that Europe should not add additional burdens to industry without 
a global climate deal in place. By contrast, Eurelectric encouraged pro-active 
policymaking at the EU level on climate change, stating that ’with international 
negotiations in the UNFCCC proceeding slowly, showing the world that the EU 
remains committed to a long-term strategy of driving carbon reduction through a 
strong ETS is crucial to securing a global level playing field in climate action’.  
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5.2 Threat of deindustrialisation, ‘carbon leakage’ and  
job losses
Several trade associations stated that climate policies would raise 
the costs of doing business in the EU to a prohibitive level, resulting 
in slowed growth and layoffs. Some trade associations explicitly 
highlighted the risk of job losses from the contraction of activity in 
energy-intensive sectors in their consultation responses. For example, 
OGP ‘urges EU policymakers to carefully weigh up the impact of 
new policies in terms of estimated ‘green job’ creation vs. the loss of industrial 
competitiveness and existing jobs in other sectors’ (OGP, 2013). An interviewee 
from a utility company recognised this, saying “On climate policy obviously it’s 
the heavy industry energy-intensives which will go and be listened to as they 
have a very, very salient political message that they will say every time and that’s 
jobs. So it’s the classic flag that they will wave at every given time. You know, 
‘What about the jobs?’ and people listen.”
Trade associations also repeatedly raised the threat of ‘carbon leakage’, 
‘investment leakage’ or deindustrialisation – whereby new energy-intensive 
industry facilities are opened outside Europe due to high energy costs in the EU. 
BUSINESSEUROPE wrote to President of the European Commission José Manuel 
Barroso in January 2014 to urge the European President that the forthcoming 
climate and energy package be ‘compatible’ with industrial competitiveness. The 
letter contains stark warnings of the likelihood of carbon leakage, noting that ’we 
are still too often faced with Commission initiatives that undermine our industrial 
competitiveness. Europe faces an ‘investment leakage’ trend, with new investments 
in manufacturing sectors increasingly taking place outside Europe notably because 
of the high costs of energy and climate policies.’ The letter added that ’it would be 
extremely damaging if the Commission proposed simultaneously a communication 
focused on how to improve our competitiveness and a climate and energy package 
containing measures undermining that goal‘(BUSINESSEUROPE, 2014a).
Trade associations including Cefic, Cembureau, CEPI, EUROFER, FuelsEurope and 
Eurometaux have also lobbied strongly on carbon leakage. In September 2014, 
they sent a joint letter to the Heads of State and Governments of the EU Member 
States ahead of the EU decision on the 2030 climate and energy framework, 
arguing that ’The EU should focus on promoting recovery and growth of industrial 
production in Europe… Current carbon leakage provisions under the EU Emissions 
Trading Directive, if not revised rapidly, will result in a huge shortage in free 
allowances and increasing direct and indirect costs… our industries are expected 
to face hundreds of billions of Euros in direct costs and costs pass through in 
electricity prices’ - emphasis in original (Cefic et al, 2014). The letter went on to 
call for confirmation ’that carbon leakage measures will be continued after 2020, 
as well as outlining the principles for the level of protection in order to safeguard 
predictability, investment certainty, jobs and growth in Europe.’
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5.3 Climate vs. competitiveness
In their responses to the consultations, many of the trade associations 
contrasted the optimism of 2007 (when the 2020 climate and energy 
targets were agreed) with the economic uncertainty seen across 
much of Europe in 2012/13. A common approach across was for 
respondents to agree with the threat climate change poses before 
going on to describe their worries about the economic condition 
of Europe both in isolation and in relation to its major regional 
trading partners. These concerns were then frequently used to support calls for a 
‘rebalancing’ of the three headline policy objectives of security of supply, climate 
mitigation and cost-effectiveness. Several respondents complained that undue 
focus had been given to climate targets, which has had a detrimental impact 
on economic growth. BUSINESSEUROPE, for example, says that ’Since 2008, 
Europe has focused energy and climate policy on environmental sustainability. 
However, major internal and international developments require Europe to “re-
balance” the three main objectives’ (BUSINESSEUROPE, 2013). 
Statements about the need to ensure adequate weight is given to all three 
objectives were also evident in consultation responses by BUSINESSEUROPE, 
OGP, Cefic, Eurometaux, FuelsEurope and Eurelectric. As stated by Eurometaux 
’The focus cannot simply be on climate change and energy alone; it should also 
cover industrial policy, competitiveness, taxes, trade, competition policy and 
innovation’. The climate vs. competiveness line of argument was reinforced by the 
investor we interviewed, who said “I think certainly in terms of how climate and 
energy policy issues are shaped is significantly influenced by the fact that there’s a 
perception that any carbon pricing, any reduction mechanism is essentially bad for 
competitiveness… it is influencing both specific policies and the policy narrative, 
which makes it difficult for any new policy or ambitious policy to come through.” 
5.4 Support for extraction of shale gas, and ending 
support for renewables
A number of trade associations pushed for the removal or phasing 
out of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets, and of 
individual national support schemes for renewables on the grounds 
that they distort the carbon price set by the EU ETS. They claimed 
that the removal of targeted support for renewable energy, ‘equal 
treatment’ for all power generation methods, and harmonisation of EU-wide 
policy would allow the market to set the price of carbon most efficiently. Trade 
groups including BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, and OGP also expressed support for 
development and use of natural gas (including ‘sustainable and safe’ exploitation 









The following trade 
associations support 
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of shale gas) as an important alternative energy source. OGP stated that ’natural 
gas from shales is potentially an opportunity for Member States to further 
diversify their natural gas supply sources, while lowering overall GHG emissions 
and stimulating economic growth.’ By contrast, Friends of the Earth Europe have 
stated that ‘The IPCC and the International Energy Agency, among others, have 
warned that the widespread development of shale gas at the global level would 
have a negative climate impact.’ (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2014).
5.5 EU Emission Trading System reforms are undesirable
There was strong agreement amongst the consultation responses from 
trade associations that we analysed (with the exception of Eurelectric) 
that the proposals contained in the Commission’s report on ‘The 
state of the European carbon market in 2012’, were short-term 
measures that would address neither a) the structural shortcoming of 
the EU ETS, b) the needs of business, nor c) emissions after 2020. 
The former assistant to an MEP that we interviewed recalled of the backloading 
debate that many trade associations “were mainly asking for MEP’s to vote 
against the backloading measures, so they wanted to kind of kill the carbon 
market whilst it was already on its dying knees really… I guess they just  
smelled blood and they really put all their efforts behind trying to [make it] really, 
really toothless.”
BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, CEPI, EUROFER, Eurometaux and OGP all took 
positions broadly in keeping with the view that backloading and other structural 
reforms were undesirable, with CEPI calling upon the European Commission 
and member states to ’thoroughly think through structural changes to the EU 
ETS, instead of a short term fix’. By contrast, Eurelectric was supportive of ETS 
reform. Of the trade associations analysed, there were only two (Eurometaux and 
FuelsEurope) who suggested that the EU ETS is currently functioning as designed, 
with supply and demand setting the price. FuelsEurope argued against the 
retiring of allowance in phase 3 of the EU ETS ’because the EU ETS is currently 
responding to the economic conditions in Europe and therefore working as 
designed’, whilst Eurometaux state that they believe the EU ETS ’functions well as 
a trading market’. 
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5.6 Support for a single GHG emissions target and more 
research for innovation and technology development
With the exception of Cefic, EUROFER and Eurometaux (whose 
position was unclear), all other trade associations suggested that 
the EU should set an overall climate ambition for 2030 based on 
a single GHG emissions reduction target (even in the absence of 
an international climate agreement). In the consultation responses 
to the EU 2030 Framework, all trade associations analysed made reference 








What were the proposed reforms to the EU Emissions  
Trading System?
The implementation of the EU Emissions Trading System has been divided 
into trading periods. The first, running from 2005 to 2007, was intended 
as a pilot project to prepare for the second phase, which would help to 
ensure the EU and its member states met their Kyoto Protocol emissions 
obligations. It only covered emissions from power generators and energy-
intensive industries, and almost all allowances were granted to participants 
free of charge. Over-allocation of allowances and reduction of emissions 
by participating firms pushed the price of allowances down almost to 
zero (European Commission, 2014a). The financial crisis and subsequent 
recession reduced aggregate demand within Europe’s economy during the 
second phase, from 2008 to 2012, causing downward pressure on the 
carbon price despite a 6.5% reduction in the overall number of allowances 
(European Commission, 2014b).
The current trading period, which lasts from 2013 to 2020, has seen a 
steady transition towards auctioning of allowances rather than free allocation, 
and operates under a single EU-wide cap instead of the previous system of 
national caps. The earlier build-up of a surplus of 2.1 billion allowances 
within the system was responsible for the low carbon price, and the European 
Commission launched a consultation from late 2012 to early 2013 to hear 
views on a number of proposals designed to reduce this ongoing structural 
excess over the long-term (European Commission, 2014c). The quotations in 
this chapter are taken from publicly-available responses to the consultation 
run from late 2012 to early 2013. The short-term approach, given final 
approval by the European Parliament in December 2013, was to postpone 
the auctioning of 900 million allowances until 2019-2020. Known as 
‘backloading’, this restriction of supply – temporarily, as the same number of 
allowances will be available over Phase Three – was intended to tighten the 
market and push up the carbon price, and was implemented in March 2014. 
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to inefficiencies arising from multiple, overlapping targets in the current 
framework, and were subsequently broadly opposed to energy efficiency 
and/or renewable energy targets for 2030. BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, CEPI, 
Eurelectric, Eurometaux, FuelsEurope, and OGP were all in favour of the EU ETS 
as the central mechanism for CO2 emissions reduction. Many trade associations 
included a great deal of focus on the importance of research for innovation and 
technology development in a future policy framework. All trade associations 
analysed suggested that the EU should provide more support for innovation and 
technology development to address climate change. 
What was the EU 2030 Framework?
In March 2013, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the 
proposed EU ‘2030 Framework’. The aim of the 2030 Framework was to 
make the European Union’s economy and energy system more competitive, 
secure and sustainable, and follows on from the EU’s first package of climate 
and energy measures which were agreed by national leaders in the EU in 
March 2007 – the so-called ‘20-20-20’ targets. The 20-20-20 targets set 
three objectives for 2020:
• 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels
• 20% rise in the share of EU energy consumption produced by 
renewable sources
• 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency
The aim of the Green Paper was to consult stakeholders to obtain evidence 
and views to support the development of the 2030 Framework. In this chapter 
we outline the responses from a number of selected trade associations to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on the 2030 Framework. It should be 
noted that these responses were submitted between March and July 2013, 
before an agreement on the targets was made. The Green Paper did not 
outline specific proposals for targets and features of the new framework 
but rather sought feedback to build on the experience and lessons from the 
original framework. Hence, responses from the trade associations were made 
with the view that all aspects of the policy framework were open to discussion 
and debate. 
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5.7 Support for completion of the internal energy market 
and an industrial policy target
BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, CEPI, Eurelectric, FuelsEurope and OGP 
all stated the importance of completing the internal energy market 
through full implementation of the third energy package. With 
regards to industrial competitiveness, BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, 
CEPI, EUROFER and Eurometaux all expressed support for an 
industrial policy target (e.g. inclusion of a target for 20% of Europe’s 
GDP to come from industry by 2020 and beyond), whilst FuelsEurope 
and OGP were explicitly against the use of such targets. FuelsEurope 
stated that ’regarding the other objectives of the EU energy policy, 
namely competitiveness and security of supply, EUROPIA [now FuelsEurope] does 
not consider that binding targets are necessarily the best instrument to promote 
them’. OGP said that it ’does not consider targets as good instruments to promote 
or measure competitiveness and/or security of energy supply.’ 
ISSUE DESCRIPTION BUSINESS
EUROPE





Short-termism The proposals are short-term 
measures that would address 
neither a) the structural 
shortcoming of the EU ETS, b) the 




Investments have been and will be 
made with the expectation that the 
regulatory landscape will remain 
stable – therefore changes should 
not be made to the ETS.
Market IS 
working
The EU ETS functions as designed, 
with supply and demand setting 
the price
Carbon leakage Reforms will increase the risk of 
firms relocating production outside 
Europe
Competitiveness Increased costs will mean 
European businesses will not be 
able to compete globally
Need for a 
global deal
Europe should not add additional 
burdens to industry without a 




Targets should be based on a 
bottom-up assessment of what 
is technologically feasible and 
economically viable
Table 3: Trade Association responses to European Commission consultation on structural options to 
strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System
Trade association puts forward this argument
Not identified as a key priority amongst sources reviewed.
The following trade 
associations supported 







But it was opposed by:
• FuelsEurope
• OGP
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy39
ISSUE DESCRIPTION BUSINESS
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There is a need to balance climate 
objectives, ensuring that adequate 






Support for a global climate 
agreement in 2015
The level of ambition for targets 
should be decided within the 
context of an international climate 
agreement
The EU should set an overall 
climate ambition for 2030 based 
on a single GHG target (including 
in the absence of an international 
climate agreement)
Targets for energy efficiency and 
renewable energy are not efficient 
policy mechanisms
EU ETS The EU ETS should be the central 





The EU should provide more 
support for innovation and 
technology development to 
address climate change
Energy sources The development and use of 
natural gas (including shale gas) 




Support for completion of the 
internal energy market (e.g. 




Support for an industrial policy 
target (e.g. Inclusion of a 20% of 
industry share in GDP by 2020 
and beyond)
Table 4: Trade associations’ responses to the European Commission consultation about the Green Paper on 
a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Trade association puts forward this argument
View not expressed on this issue in consultation response
Trade association holds different view
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6 How well the activities of  
trade associations represent  
the sustainability policies of  
member companies
The debate about how well trade associations represent their members on 
climate policy has recently been thrown into the spotlight. On 21st August 2014, 
Microsoft left the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), leading to 
speculation this was because of ALEC’s opposition to renewable energy (Natter, 
2014). The next day, consumer products giant Unilever ended its membership of 
trade association BUSINESSEUROPE, hinting at tensions with the lobby group’s 
stance on environmental policies by stating that ’we are committed to working 
with trade associations and likeminded companies who can come together to 
create tipping points for products and markets. With this in mind it is important 
we review our memberships on an ongoing basis’ (Shankleman, 2014).  The 
former assistant to an MEP that we interviewed noted the change in Unilever’s 
public stance since leaving BUSINESSEUROPE, stating “And you might have seen 
Unilever… they recently left BUSINESSEUROPE. Since they’ve left you’ve seen a 
huge difference in their lobby asks and they’ve just come out with a position on 
2030 and I nearly fell off my chair when I read it, it’s so good... it’s better than a 
lot of governments. Any government I think.”
On 22nd September 2014, Google also announced that it was leaving ALEC. 
The next day Google Chairman Eric Schmidt clarified that this was because of 
ALEC’s opposition to action on climate change. “The people who oppose it are 
really hurting our children and grandchildren and making the world a much 
worse place,” Schmidt said on NPR’s ‘Diane Rehm Show’ “We should not be 
aligned with such people. They are just literally lying” (Sneider and Womack, 
2014). Yahoo, Facebook and Yelp followed in that week with statements 
clarifying that they too had let their affiliations with ALEC expire (Nicks, 2014). 
6.1 Investor and civil society concerns about misalignment between 
companies and their trade associations on climate policy
In some cases, investors and civil society actors have become concerned that 
direct lobbying by companies, and indirect lobbying via trade associations, is 
undermining the long-term economic security and value of those companies in 
favour of short-term policy wins. A review of the proxy voting season in 2013 
in the US noted that ‘Shareholder proposals addressing corporate political 
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spending and political activities remain the largest issues area for environmental 
and social shareholder proposal activity for the second year in a row’ 
(Institutional Shareholder Services, 2013). The influence of trade associations 
that may be misrepresenting the views of companies that are relatively supportive 
of progressive climate policy is a particular area of concern, with a recent 
report stating that in the US ‘many companies have board seats on associations 
that hold climate change positions in direct opposition to their own’ (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 2013). The investor we interviewed echoed concerns 
about EU trade associations facing similar conflicts.
Some NGOs and investors have criticised trade associations for failing to align 
with the long-term interests of their members companies. As the investor we 
interviewed for this project put it: “the point is not that trade associations per 
se are bad.  Our concern is that they are being funded to represent the short-
term interests of the sector, which may not ultimately be in the long-term interests 
of investors, such as ourselves and ultimately our clients, whose money we are 
stewards of and investing on their behalf.” A report into lobbying activities by US 
companies has stated that the impact of this short-termist or misaligned lobbying 
can be the defeat or delay of policy efforts to address climate change, which 
’has huge implications for government, the economy, public well-being, and the 
planet’ (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2012). 
There has been some criticism of the positions of trade associations on climate 
policy for failing to recognise the interests of their members. For example, 
Greenpeace have stated that ‘even general business associations, such as the US 
Chamber of Commerce,  BUSINESSEUROPE or the Japanese Nippon Keidanren 
- which often have hundreds of members - lobby against climate change 
legislation, thereby advancing the interests of a few while claiming to speak on 
behalf of all their members’ (Greenpeace, 2011). This was reinforced by one of 
the trade association representatives we interviewed, who said that “in my view 
many of the heavy intensive industry trade associations here in Brussels are a lot 
more black and white about the world than are the companies behind them.” 
6.2 The positions of trade associations on climate change
All of the trade associations profiled in this report had publicly available 
statements about their commitment to dealing with climate change; for 
example, Cefic (the European Chemical Industry Council) ‘strongly supports the 
international efforts on market based mechanism as [greenhouse gas] mitigation 
tools’ (Cefic, 2012) and the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) 
says that ‘Sustainability is central to all European paper industry activities 
and a large proportion of our resources are devoted to ensuring the industry 
minimises its environmental impacts across the EU’ (CEPI, 2011). Some NGOs 
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have expressed scepticism about the depth of the commitment of some trade 
associations to mitigating climate change, though, particularly in energy intensive 
sectors. One NGO told us “In general terms we all… support climate action. 
The question is, will it be conditional on actions in the international negotiations? 
What are the details for the allocation of free emission allowances? Is climate 
action really backed up with clean technology?... the devil is within the detail”.
Interestingly, one of the trade association representatives we interviewed said 
that “You will hear, if you interview some of the energy intensive associations, 
lots of language about climate. Listen very, very carefully. They acknowledge the 
challenge, want a stronger carbon price to tackle this. The issue is they never 
say exactly what for or exactly when. It’s a mañana position. And there’s lots of 
weasel wording… When I sit with these people…behind closed doors – what I 
actually hear is climate denial. Why are we being bothered about this bollocks, 
why won’t it just go away? I know other associations for instance advise their 
members not to worry about climate policy in the new [Juncker] Commission as it 
won’t exist”.
6.3 Responsibility of companies to manage and engage with their 
trade associations
A solution to the problem of corporates offering a ‘fractured’, unaligned or 
contradictory voice on climate change has been calls from NGOs and UN 
agencies for companies to align their sustainability policies with their lobbying 
activities; no small feat for organisations like Unilever, which employ over 
167,000 people worldwide (Unilever, n.d.). One of the authors of this paper 
contributed to the Guide to Responsible Corporate Engagement in Climate Policy 
(UN Global Compact et al., 2013) which concluded that companies should 
undertake actions in three areas:
• Identify – Co-ordinate with internal and external experts to inventory their 
influences on policy processes, the risks and opportunities for alignment.
• Align – Complete internal audit to ensure the company has consistent 
positions, strategies and investments that align to mitigate climate change.
• Report – Transparently disclose the company’s positions and actions on 
climate change – and the outcome of these.
Others have called for businesses to go beyond ensuring internal consistency, 
and use a clear, consistent message to pro-actively advocate for progressive 
climate policies. For example, Steve Howard, Chief Sustainability Officer at 
IKEA, stated in 2013 that: 
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‘There is an old expression which is that winners go to market and losers go to 
Washington. But we now need the winners to go to Washington and Brussels 
and Beijing to help unlock business innovation and investment to get this problem 
solved. We have seen there is a silent majority of businesses which want to see 
effective leadership from government on climate change but they have not known 
what to advocate for or may have felt it is not their responsibility to do something 
about. The key is now for business to find its voice ... We cannot defend the 
status quo and at the same time build a sustainable future at pace and scale. 
The strategic assets of the 21st century will be clean air and clean water and 
renewable energy; it is not about defending the right to pollute.’
Steve Howard (Chief Sustainability Officer, IKEA) as quoted in Confino, 2013
This clearly still remains a current area of concern at the time of writing. For 
example, in December 2014 the Institutional Investors’ Group on Climate 
Change (IIGCC) published ‘Investor Expectations: Oil and Gas Company 
Strategy’ which outlined issues they expected investors to raise with oil and 
gas companies, which included ‘Engage with public policy makers and other 
stakeholders in support of cost-effective policy measures to mitigate climate 
change risks and support low carbon investments, such as those advocated for 
in the 2014 Global Investor Statement on Climate Change. Ensure there is broad 
oversight and transparency about the company’s lobbying activity and political 
spending on this topic and related energy and regulatory issues’ (IIGCC, 2014).
6.4 Companies that are members of both trade associations and 
sustainability initiatives
It is also useful to examine which companies are members of trade associations 
lobbying in the EU on climate policy, but are also members of high-profile 
sustainability initiatives. For example, BASF are a member of CEFIC – the trade 
association that rejected the need for ‘backloading’ of the EU Emissions Trading 
System. They are also members of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), a ‘CEO-led organization of forward-thinking companies 
that galvanizes the global business community to create a sustainable future for 
business, society and the environment.’10 Similarly, AngloAmerican are a member 
of Eurometaux, a trade association that has also opposed backloading, but is a 
member of WBCSD.
10 http://www.wbcsd.org/about.aspx accessed on 19th December 2014
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Accenture BUSINESSEUROPE  and Eurelectric
AngloAmerican Eurometaux
ArcelorMittal BUSINESSEUROPE
BASF BUSINESSEUROPE and Cefic
BAYER BUSINESSEUROPE and Cefic
BMW BUSINESSEUROPE
Borealis Cefic























Proctor & Gamble BUSINESSEUROPE and Cefic
PwC Eurelectric
Samsung BUSINESSEUROPE
Table 5: Companies that are members of trade associations profiled in this report, who are also members of prominent sustainability initiatives
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6.5 Profiles of companies and sustainability initiatives
It is interesting to compare the sustainability policies of companies with the 
lobbying actions undertaken by trade associations that they are members of. 
In some cases there seems to be close alignment, while in others there appear 
to be contradictions between the sustainability policies of companies and the 
policies of trade associations that they are members of.  Profiles of the trade 
associations we have focused on are provided below, with some examples of the 
sustainability policies of their member companies. All of the trade associations 
listed below provided input into both of the two key consultations held by the 
European Commission in 2013: the Consultation on the Green Paper on a 2030 
framework for climate and energy policies, and the Consultation on structural 
options to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System.












Sasol Cefic and OGP
Siemens BUSINESSEUROPE
Solvay BUSINESSEUROPE
Statoil BUSINESSEUROPE, Cefic, 






Veolia BUSINESSEUROPE and Cefic
Volkswagen BUSINESSEUROPE
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Trade Association Profile: BUSINESSEUROPE
Formed: 1958 (as the Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne, or UNICE)
Based: Brussels
President: Emma Marcegaglia
1. Who does BUSINESSEUROPE represent? 
BUSINESSEUROPE describes itself as the leading advocate for growth and 
competitiveness at European level, standing up for companies across the 
continent and campaigning on the issues that most influence their performance. 
They claim to speak for all-sized enterprises including global household names 
such as Coca-Cola, Nestlé, and Philips, across 35 European countries whose 
national business federations are BUSINESSEUROPE’s direct members.
The organisation states that they aim to work on behalf of their member 
federations to ensure that the voice of business is heard in European policy-
making. They also represent European business in the international arena, 
’ensuring that Europe remains globally competitive’ (BUSINESSEUROPE, 2014b).
2. What is their position on climate change? 
BUSINESSEUROPE’s website states that they recognise the challenge of 
’ensure[ing] sustainable access to and use of resources without causing 
environmental problems that disrupt supply-chains, hamper important eco-
systems, cause dangerous climate change or negatively affect biodiversity’ 
(BUSINESSEUROPE, 2014c).
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
BUSINESSEUROPE interacts regularly with the European Parliament, Commission 
and Council as well as other stakeholders in the policy community, mainly 
through the production of written statements and letters and also formal 
consultation responses. In January 2014, BusinnessEurope’s President and 
Director General wrote a letter on behalf of its member federations to the 
President of the European Commission urging him to “ensure that the 2030 
climate and energy package is fully compatible with the imperative need of 
strengthening our industries and restoring Europe as a place for industrial 
investment.” According to their self-reported entry in the EU Transparency 
Register, BUSINESSEUROPE employs 27 lobbyists, 23 of which have access to 
the European Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
BUSINESSEUROPE has drawn criticism from renewable energy companies 
and green groups in the past for its stance on climate change policy, being 
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labelled ‘old fashioned’ and increasingly out of sync with current thinking among 
progressive businesses on the need for Europe to deliver deep cuts in carbon 
emissions post 2020 (BusinessGreen, 2014).
In the response to the EU consultation on options to reform the EU Emissions 
Trading System, BUSINESSEUROPE opposed the ’backloading’ proposal on the 
basis that it would ’undermine the regulatory predictability through to 2020 as 
established under the EU ETS and further deteriorate the global competitiveness 
of Europe.’ They also stated that ’BUSINESSEUROPE opposes any unilateral 
increase of the emission reduction target for 2020 unless other industrialized 
countries assume comparable emission reductions and developing countries put 
in place measures to fight climate change with their respective capacities.’ More 
recently, BUSINESSEUROPE released a press statement (dated 24th October 
2014) in response to key features of the EU energy and climate policy agreed 
upon post-2020, in which it labelled the 40% emissions reduction target as 
‘highly ambitious’ and called for greater consideration for competiveness. On 
the final, agreed targets, BUSINESSEUROPE Director General, Markus J. Beyrer, 
stated that ‘EU leaders didn’t have the strength to re-orientate Europe’s climate 
and energy policy towards the international competitiveness of EU industry.’ 
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
BUSINESSEUROPE discloses a list of national trade federations that hold 
membership of the European body, as well as a list of 63 companies on their 
‘Corporate Advisory and Support Group.’ There is a diversity of different 
sectors represented on this Group. Although they are not currently listed as 
partner companies Coca-Cola stated in the CDP information request for both 
2013 and 2014 that its position on climate change was inconsistent with 
BUSINESSEUROPE, because ‘for companies it is essential to operate in a 
predictable EU policy framework which integrates climate protection, energy 
security as well as competitiveness concerns’ and ‘the EU’s 2007 Climate and 
Energy Package with its ambitious 2020 targets to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, to increase the share of renewable energy and to improve energy 
efficiency has triggered a policy and legislative agenda with far-reaching 
consequences for European companies’. Coca-Cola seems to state that their 
desire for policy stability cannot be easily aligned with BUSINESSEUROPE’s 
position on climate policy.
The difficulty of agreeing positions within trade associations with broad 
memberships was also underlined by the response of ArcelorMittal to the CDP 
information request, which said: ‘The National and Regional industry and 
business associations represent the position of many industries, which don’t 
confront the same technological challenges as the steel industry. An example of 
this is the energy sector, that could be motivated to increase carbon prices’ – 
something that ArcelorMittal (also a BUSINESSEUROPE member) opposes.
 
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy49
Trade Association Profile: Confederation of European Paper Industries
Formed: 1992
Based: Brussels
Director General: Marco Mensink
1. Who does CEPI represent?
The Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI) is a non-profit making 
organisation which claims to be regrouping the European pulp and paper 
industry and championing the industry’s achievements and the benefits of its 
products. Through its 18 member countries (17 European Union members 
plus Norway) CEPI represents some 520 pulp, paper and board producing 
companies across Europe, ranging from small and medium sized companies 
to multi-nationals, and 940 paper mills. Together they represent 24% of world 
production of paper (CEPI, 2014a) 
2. What is their position on climate change? 
CEPI recognises climate change as a challenge and in its 2013 Sustainability 
Report, states one of its ambitions as to ‘help combat climate change and 
minimise our impact on the environment’ (CEPI, 2013). 
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
CEPI engages with policymakers through various means such as consultations, 
press releases, holding events, and meeting with policymakers and legislators. 
CEPI was a signatory in an open letter from the Alliance of Energy Intensive 
Industries to the heads of State and Governments of the EU Member States, the 
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European 
Commission, demanding immediate protection from carbon leakage. According 
to their self-reported entry in the EU Transparency Register, CEPI employs 9 
lobbyists, 4 of which have access to the European Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
CEPI has been reported as a leader in developing technological solutions to 
reduce carbon emissions and address climate change (The Economist, 2013), 
whilst also advocating for greater policy focus on EU industrial competiveness 
(CEPI, 2014b)
CEPI explicitly contrasted climate policy and competitiveness in response to the 
EU consultation on 2030 targets, stating that ‘Without a strong industrial policy, 
climate targets make no sense. So far industrial policy has been laid down in 
policy documents only, where climate policy has resulted in legislation. This 
situation needs a rebalance.’ In response to the consultation on strengthening 
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the EU Emissions Trading System, it said that ‘We have understood that the EU 
target of 20% only moves to 30% when an international binding climate change 
agreement is reached. As these pre-requisites are not there, the Commission 
would be exceeding its powers if it would propose to increase the 2020 target to 
-30% within the context of the EU ETS review.’
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
CEPI discloses a list of 4 companies who are ‘CEPI Partners’, as well as a list 
of the national trade federations that are part of CEPI. Although they are not 
currently listed as a CEPI partner, Sappi (a wood pulp and paper company) 
stated in the CDP information request for 2014 that they had a mixed consistency 
with CEPI’s stance on climate policy, noting that ‘The backloading of EU ETS 
allowances was defeated in the European Parliament on 18 April 2013. While 
supporting the EU ETS as a policy instrument to meet the EU’s climate objectives, 
the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (to which CEPI belongs) was opposed 
to any modification of the EU ETS rules which would damage further industry’s 
competitiveness. The Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries therefore called for 
the rejection of the back-loading proposal’. Sappi’s declaration that the two 
organisations’ views are not consistent shows that consensus does not always 
exist either between trade associations themselves, their members, or the pan-
European bodies to which they may belong.
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Trade Association Profile: Eurelectric 
Formed: 1989
Based: Brussels
President: Johannes Teyssen 
 
1. Who does Eurelectric represent?
EURELECTRIC is the sector association which claims to represent the common 
interests of the electricity industry at pan-European level, plus its affiliates and 
associates on several other continents. It currently has over 30 full members 
which represent the electricity industry in 32 European countries.
2. What is their position on climate change?
Eurelectric states that they believe climate change is a major threat which 
requires urgent action at an international scale. On their website, they state 
‘we are strongly committed to reducing carbon emissions and meeting the EU’s 
climate targets for 2020 and its 2050 climate vision’ (Eurelectric, 2014). 
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
Eurelectric puts out a range of publications including briefing, positions papers, 
reports and consultation responses, as well as organising events and working 
groups that bring together members. According to their self-reported entry in 
the EU Transparency Register, Eurelectric employs 7 lobbyists, 6 of which have 
access to the European Parliament.
 
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
EURELECTRIC has adopted a largely progressive stance on climate policy, 
arguing in response to the EU 2030 consultation for ‘an economy-wide 2030 
emissions reduction target of at least 40% compared to 1990, in line with 
the Commission’s Low-carbon Economy Roadmap 2050’. In response to the 
consultation on reforms to the EU Emissions Trading System, EURELECTRIC 
called for the EU to show leadership on emissions reductions, stating that ‘With 
international negotiations in the UNFCCC proceeding slowly, showing the world 
that the EU remains committed to a long-term strategy of driving carbon reduction 
through a strong ETS is crucial to securing a global level playing field in climate 
action.’ 
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
The positions taken by EURELECTRIC seem to be consistent with the positions of 
its member organisations; for example, American multinational technology and 
consulting corporation IBM have stated that ‘climate change is a serious concern 
that warrants meaningful action on a global basis’. Similarly, multinational 
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professional services network PricewaterhouseCoopers claims that although 
it has a relatively low environmental footprint, believes ’good environmental 
stewardship is part of an organisation’s licence to operate’ (PwC, 2015). 
Another member company, Pöyry, a global consulting and engineering firm 
focusing on the energy, forest industry and infrastructure and environment sectors 
advocates for‘“committing now to a clear carbon pricing framework to deliver 
the next phase of power sector decarbonisation to 2030 and pursuing policy 
initiatives that support the effectiveness of carbon pricing’ (Pöyry. 2013). 
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Trade Association Profile: EUROFER 
Formed: 1976
Based: Brussels
Director General: Axel Eggert 
1. Who does EUROFER represent?
EUROFER state that they represent 100% of the steel production in the EU, and 
its membership consists of national trade associations and individual companies. 
The industry in Europe has an annual turnover of €170bn and directly employs 
350,000 people (EUROFER, 2013a)
The EUROFER entry in the EU Transparency Register (2014a) states: ‘The 
objectives of EUROFER are to provide information, services and guidance to 
its members related to European and international policy affairs and political, 
economic and market analysis, and providing guidance for the implementation of 
EU legislation’.
2. What is their position on climate change? 
EUROFER acknowledges the threat of climate change and points to how, since 
1970, the steel sector in Europe has halved its emissions per tonne produced 
(EUROFER, 2013b). It nevertheless argues that if ambitious climate policies are 
pursued in the absence of global level playing field, this will simply serve to 
export growth and jobs to other regions. Moreover, they argue that European 
steel producers are among the most efficient in the world, and pushing them to 
areas with less stringent environmental regulation would be likely to create a net 
rise in emissions.
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
EUROFER takes part in formal lobbying in the shape of stakeholder workshops, 
stakeholder consultations, press releases, position documents and technical 
documents. It also carries out more personal lobbying activities such as bilateral 
meetings with Directorate-Generals in Brussels. According to their self-reported 
entry in the EU Transparency Register, EUROFER has one lobbyist, with no access 
to the EU Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
EUROFER is engaging with key decision-makers on major issues around structural 
reform of the European carbon market, and EU energy and climate policy to 
2030. With the price of steel set globally, and producers in developing countries 
facing lower costs, EUROFER feels that any policy revisions to the carbon market 
(such as backloading or retiring allowances) would unfairly penalise an industry 
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that is already operating very close to its technical limits. It estimates that, instead 
of the 43% reduction objective in the Commission Low Carbon Roadmap, current 
technologies would allow for a 10% reduction at most (EUROFER, 2013c). 
EUROFER also published a letter in February 2014 calling, among other things, 
for Europe not to ‘impose on itself unilateral CO2 reduction targets which no-one 
else follows’ (EUROFER, 2014).
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
A prominent example of EUROFER member company is ArcelorMittal 
headquartered in Luxembourg, which is the world’s largest steel producer. 
It states that it aims to design products for the low carbon economy, and to 
reduce carbon emissions from its own production processes – specifically, by 
8% by 2020. The views of ArcelorMittal appear largely to accord with those of 
EUROFER: they support a ‘co-ordinated and binding global plan’, which should 
include both developed and emerging economies. Furthermore, this should be 
based on a bottom-up assessment of what each sector can realistically contribute, 
without which ‘European steelmakers are unfairly disadvantaged at a time when 
they are least resilient’. The company also engages ‘with international bodies 
to ensure that the debate on issues such as ‘carbon cap and trade’ schemes is 
balanced and well-informed’, with the objective of ensuring all such schemes 
are ‘appropriate, fair and achievable’ (ArcelorMittal, n.d.). ArcelorMittal has 
stated publicly that the ETS ‘will put European steelmakers at a severe economic 
disadvantage compared with competitors outside the EU, despite the substantial 
investment by the European steel industry in low carbon steel research’ 
(ArcelorMittal, n.d.). 
The Tata Group is an Indian multinational conglomerate company headquartered 
in Mumbai, Maharashtra, India. It is slightly more ambitious than ArcelorMittal, 
estimating that its group emissions can be reduced by 10-15% (although no 
date is given for when these emission reductions would be implemented), 
(TATA, n.d.). If this is taken as a long term goal, it is not far removed from the 
EUROFER position on the possible emission reductions that are possible in the 
steel industry, as Tata’s proposed emission cuts is far below the 40% whole 
economy emission reduction goal put forward by the European Commission – 
and some of Tata’s improvements in efficiency may happen in their operations 
outside of the EU, which may not be as efficient as European facilities. Tata also 
describes its strategic collaboration with ‘forward-thinking companies and global 
organisations’ such as the UN Environment Programme and the UN Global 
Compact Caring for Climate Initiative.
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Trade Association Profile: Eurometaux
Formed: 1957 (as the Comité de Liaison des Industries de Métaux Non Ferreux 
de la Communauté Economique Européenne)
Based: Brussels
Director General: Guy Thiran
1. Who does Eurometaux represent?
Eurometaux is the EU association of the non-ferrous metals industry, representing 
the main EU and international metals producers, EU and international metal 
commodity groups and national metal federations. The industry covers base 
metals, precious metals and technical metals, manufactured from both primary 
and recycled raw materials. The organisation claims to maintain an open 
and constructive dialogue with the European authorities and international or 
intergovernmental bodies in all areas of policy and legislation. By doing so, 
Eurometaux aims to ensure early consultation and promote the industry’s views 
and positions (Eurometaux, 2012). 
2. What is their position on climate change? 
Eurometaux accepts the need to stop climate change, in principle, stating that ’we 
are fully committed to active participation in EU efforts to ensure the sustainable use 
of energy resources and to combat climate change’ (Eurometaux, n.d.).
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
Eurometaux engages with policymakers through various means, and was also 
a signatory in an open letter from the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries to 
the heads of State and Governments of the EU Member States, the European 
Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, 
demanding immediate protection from carbon leakage. According to their self-
reported entry in the EU Transparency Register, Eurometaux employs 8 lobbyists, 
6 of which have access to the European Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
Eurometaux has focused strongly on industrial competitiveness, arguing for it 
to be placed on an equal footing with climate and energy goals.  In a recent 
position paper, shortly before the European Council’s 23-24 October conclusions 
on the EU 2030 climate and energy framework, Eurometaux stressed the 
importance of ensuring long-term protection and compensation for industries 
affected by carbon leakage under the revised EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), 
and stated in response to the EU consultation on the 2030 targets that ‘Legally 
binding climate targets for CO2 emission reductions should be accompanied 
by legally binding compensation to carbon leakage exposed industries, arising 
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from direct and indirect costs due to the EU/ETS, based on actual production’ 
and that the EU should ‘allow for the deployment of all energy sources, enabling 
competitive prices’. 
Eurometaux also ferociously opposed to the backloading of the EU Emissions 
Trading System, stating in response to the EU consultation that ‘the European non-
ferrous metals industries, as well as other energy-intensive industries in Europe, 
are now fighting for their survival, carrying significant extra cost burdens in 
carbon and energy costs. ’Back-loading’ and other ad hoc measures to measure 
the balance of the EUA market will exacerbate the problems for industry without 
rectifying the weakness of the EU ETS.’ They also say that ‘The EU ETS functions 
well as a trading market and the goal of reducing GHG emissions by 20% by 
2020 compared to the 1990 level is met. Options to tighten the EU ETS market 
should only be considered for the next trading period after 2020.’ Assertions 
that the EU currently functions well are strongly contested by green groups and 
politicians, who note that the carbon leakage list (which provides free allowances 
to industries seen as at risk from a high carbon price) assumes an emissions 
allowance price of €30 a tonne, but current levels are far below that, at around 
€6 per tonne.
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
Prominent members of Eurometaux include Rio Tinto Alcan, one of five product 
groups operated by Rio Tinto, a leading international mining group. Rio Tinto 
has stated that it ‘recognises that addressing the climate change challenge will 
require…capital investments and behaviour changes in global energy, transport, 
industrial, community and infrastructure systems’ and that ‘At Rio Tinto Alcan, 
we believe that climate change solutions must ultimately be global and involve 
all major emitters… recognition of early action can encourage further progress’. 
Similarly, member company Anglo American states that ‘Climate change is a key 
challenge of our era. We recognise the need to take meaningful action towards 
addressing its causes, and to help protect our employees, assets, as well as the 
communities and environments linked to our operations, against its potential 
impacts.’ Asturiana de Zinc is a member of Eurometaux, and its parent company 
Glencore has stated ‘We recognise that climate change issues are part of the 
political, societal and regulatory landscape in which we operate…. The weight 
of global scientific opinion on climate change calls for significant reductions 
in human-generated greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) worldwide’ (Glencore, 
2015).  It is questionable whether Eurometaux’s stance on the proposed reforms 
to the EU ETS and the carbon leakage list help to achieve ‘meaningful’ or ‘early’ 
action on climate change, although the statements about the need for ‘global 
solutions’ aligns with the language used by Eurometaux.
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1. Who does Cefic represent?
Cefic represents 29,000 large, medium and small European chemicals 
companies, which it states are together directly responsible for employing 1.2 
million jobs and account for 20% of chemical production worldwide. It has 
640 members and affiliates, consisting of a variety of companies and national 
trade associations. The entry for Cefic in the EU Transparency Register states: 
‘The Association shall pursue mainly a scientific purpose by promoting all issues 
of interest to the chemical industry, in the widest sense, in Europe and in the 
countries where it operates, and its contribution to sustainable development.’
2. What is their position on climate change?
Cefic recognises climate change as an international issues, and ‘strongly 
supports the international efforts on market based mechanism as [greenhouse 
gas] mitigation tools’ (Cefic, 2012). It argues that there ought to be a balance 
between the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainability, and that 
top-down climate targets should only be implemented in the advent of a global 
deal. Otherwise, targets should be based on bottom-up feasibility assessments.
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
Cefic responds to consultations, puts out press releases, hosts events, and meets 
with policymakers and legislators. According to their self-reported entry in the EU 
Transparency Register, Cefic employs 75 lobbyists, 15 of which have access to 
the European Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
Cefic has opposed action to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System, 
stating that ‘Cefic rejects the idea of an intervention in the ETS in phase 3 i.e. 
in the absence of a global climate policy agreement. Such intervention would 
not improve but directly worsen the measures against carbon leakage without 
any environmental need’ and has clearly stated that it believes a strong EU 
climate target should only be put in place if there is agreement among all of the 
region’s competitors, asserting that the EU should ‘set a top-down climate target 
conditionally only in case of a substantial global agreement with comparable 
burdens for industry worldwide. In the absence of a global agreement provide 
bottom-up calculations to define a realistic, cost-efficient range for a climate goal, 
taking scenarios into account.’
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5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
There is a question around whether Cefic’s positions represent the interests of its 
members. For example, Veolia Enviroment S.A. has stated that ‘Climate change 
is largely the result of an economic model made popular since the Industrial 
Revolution of the 19th century, rooted in the extensive, linear consumption of 
natural resources, especially fossil fuels. The now-acknowledged effects of climate 
change provide ample proof that this model is untenable from an environmental, 
economic and social standpoint.’ Similarly, Bayer in the UK/Ireland region 
is part of the global concern Bayer AG, based in Leverkusen, Germany. The 
company works across three business units – HealthCare, MaterialScience and 
CropScience. On its website, BAYER states that ’We take climate change as an 
environmental and economic challenge seriously. It affects the foundations of our 
commercial activity… endeavours in the field of environmental protection have to 
be strengthened…[and] greater attention needs to be paid to innovative solutions 
to deal with the consequences of climate change.’ (Bayer, 2014).
The difficulties of aligning a serious corporate policy on addressing climate 
change with some of the positions adopted by Cefic is illustrated by Unilever, 
who said in response to CDP that ‘Cefic’s position on climate change is more or 
less consistent with our own. We are aligned with respect to our understanding 
of the importance of climate change and the need for action, but we are not 
aligned on some specific issues, particularly the need for ‘backloading’ to 
strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System.’ The importance of corporate 
leadership is emphasised by an American multinational Johnson & Johnson, 
which manufactures medical devices, pharmaceutical and consumer packaged 
goods manufacturer, which has expressed the view that ’Until effective public 
energy policies are in place to reduce GHG emissions, companies should lead 
by implementing voluntary reductions of GHG’s within their control. Companies 
should continually strive to improve the energy efficiency of their operations, 
products, and services’ (Johnson & Johnson, 2012).
Some of the positions put forward by member companies do align with statements 
by Cefic; for example, Norwegian multinational oil and gas company Statoil 
supports the efforts of the UN and its member states to agree on and implement 
necessary climate measures to reach the required global ambition level to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. However 
it argues that ’Climate policy measures should be predictable, transparent and 
internationally applied in order to avoid carbon leakage, ensure cost effectiveness 
and create a level playing field in global markets’ (Staoil, 2014). This aligns with 
Cefic’s statements about the importance of the EU only setting ambitious climate 
targets if its major trading partners adopt similar measures.
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1. Who does FuelsEurope represent? 
Known as EUROPIA until June 2014, FuelsEurope was established to represent 
the interests of refining companies operating within the EU. It states that its 43 
members account for almost all EU refining capacity and three quarters of EU 
motor fuel retail sales (FuelsEurope, 2014a). 
2. What is their position on climate change? 
The EU Transparency Register (2014b) states that ‘FuelsEurope aims to promote 
economically and environmentally sustainable refining, supply and use of 
petroleum products in the EU, by providing input and expert advice to the EU 
Institutions’ It supports the Commission’s efforts to mitigate climate change, 
and welcomes the greater focus on a greenhouse gas target as the key driver 
for emissions reductions. However, it does not feel that cost-effectiveness and 
competitiveness have been given sufficient consideration, and believes that a 
unilateral emissions reduction target of 40% should not be adopted without 
similar commitments from other parts of the world. Like the steel industry, it 
claims that a 40% reduction in GHG emissions for ETS sectors is unfeasible 
(FuelsEurope, 2014b). It also resists any effort to reform the European carbon 
market on the grounds that regulatory certainty is essential for encouraging long-
term investment (FuelsEurope, 2014c).
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
FuelsEurope interacts with policymakers through a range of public channels: for 
example, responses to consultations and events for industry and policymakers. It 
also publishes statistical information on its website in order to inform the debate, 
and produces position papers, press releases, and longer publications, such as 
reports on the future of European refining. According to their self-reported entry 
in the EU Transparency Register, FuelsEurope employs six lobbyists, five of whom 
have access to the European Parliament.
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
FuelsEurope has explicitly called for the EU to set its emissions reduction targets 
based on commitments from other countries and regions, stating in response 
to the EU 2030 consultation that ‘The level of ambition of any target should 
be set in a transparent way and should take into account the differing pace of 
commitments by other countries, in order to ensure that EU competitiveness is 
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maintained’. In response to the EU consultation on reforms to the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme, it went on to say that ‘The EU has committed not to increase 
its target unilaterally until other developed countries commit themselves to 
comparable emission reductions, and economically more advanced developing 
countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Unilaterally increasing the EU’s CO2 reduction target will impact the 
competitive position of the EU economy without having any noticeable impact in 
terms of global CO2 mitigation’.
5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
British multinational oil and gas company BP argues that the scale of the climate 
challenge is such that governments must act by setting a clear, stable and 
effective carbon policy framework. Further, that ’a global carbon price should 
be the long-term goal, but regional and national approaches are a good first 
step, provided temporary financial relief is given to sectors that are exposed to 
international competition’ (BP, 2015). This would seem to be broadly aligned 
with the positions of FuelsEurope, but in response to CDP’s climate questionnaire, 
Shell – another major oil and gas firm – stated in both 2013 and 2014 that it 
had mixed consistency with both FuelsEurope and OGP’s stances on climate 
policy, saying that the trade association supported ‘the ETS in the EU but did not 
support the need for the ETS backloading amendment’.
French multinational oil and gas company Total is broadly in line with 
FuelsEurope’s position on the need for international agreement stating ’Total is 
in favor of an international agreement on limiting green house gas emissions 
that would be implemented gradually and would not distort competition among 
the world’s regions’ (Total, 2013). Similarly, American multinational oil and gas 
corporation ExxonMobil appears to be aligned with FuelsEurope in regard to 
setting emission reduction targets based on commitments from other countries and 
regions. It states that ’Developing countries already account for more than half 
of current GHG emissions globally, and by around 2020, cumulative historical 
GHG emissions from developing and developed economies will be equal. 
Therefore, both developed countries and the major developing economies need 
to participate in crafting policies aimed at mitigating global CO2 emissions.’ 
(ExxonMobil, 2015).
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Trade Association Profile: International Association of Oil and  
Gas Producers
Formed: 1974
Based: London and Brussels
Executive Director: Michael Engell-Jensen
 
1. Who does OGP represent?
OGP states that they work on behalf of the world’s oil and gas exploration 
and production companies to promote safe, responsible, and sustainable 
operations (OGP, 2014a). Their membership is comprised of private, public 
and state-owned upstream companies such as Shell, BP and BHP Billiton as well 
as regional, national or international associations consisting of two or more 
company members and which are directly concerned with exploration and/or 
production (OGP, 2014b).
2. What is their position on climate change?
OGP recognises the need to stop climate change in principle, stating in one of 
their publications that ‘the oil and gas industry recognises that the challenges of 
climate change need to be addressed now, and it is ready to play its role, whilst 
also meeting growing global energy demand’ (OGP and IPIECA, n.d.).
3. How do they engage with policymakers?
OGP engages with policymakers through various means, including policy 
briefings, events and provision of technical expertise.  According to their self-
reported entry in the EU Transparency Register, OGP employs 10 lobbyists, of 
which seven have access to the European Parliament.
 
4. What are they engaging with policymakers on?
In a recent open letter to the Heads of State and Government of the European 
Union, OGP’s EU Affairs Director stressed the importance of ‘a policy that 
protects the climate and ensures secure, safe and competitive energy for citizens 
and industries in the European Union’ (OGP, 2014c). The letter was written 
shortly before the 2030 climate agreement took place, and covered many of 
the same points as OGP’s responses to the European Commission’s consultation 
documents, including support for a single greenhouse gas target that could be 
reached by pricing carbon according to the ETS, and advocating support for oil 
and gas exploration in Europe. It also urges President van Rompuy to ‘put the 
consumer at the centre’ by ensuring technology neutrality. In their consultation 
responses OGP pushed for the phased removal of all production subsidies, giving 
proper consideration to the risks posed by carbon leakage. 
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5. Who are their members and are their positions aligned?
OGP’s arguments in favour of extracting shale gas align with the views of 
its member company BG Group, who state that ‘natural gas can make an 
immediate and material contribution to lowering GHG emissions when displacing 
more intensive fossil fuels such as coal’ and have active shale gas operations  
in Australian and the USA . By contrast, Friends of the Earth have argued  
that ‘While gas is often promoted as an ideal source of energy for the transition 
to decarbonising our energy systems, the most recent science has shown that  
gas production and transportation are far from clean’ (Friends of the Earth 
Europe, 2014).
BHP Billiton also supports a carbon price, saying that ‘an effective, long-term 
climate change policy framework should use a portfolio of complementary 
measures to reduce emissions and build resilience.  This should include a price 
on carbon that addresses competitiveness concerns’. Likewise, Chevron appears 
to hold similar views on tackling climate change whilst also being aware of 
competitiveness concerns: ‘As we work to address climate change risks, we 
must create solutions that achieve environmental objectives without undermining 
growth of the global economy and our aspirations for a better quality of life  
for all.’.
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7 How trade associations collate 
their members’ views
As detailed in Chapter 6, concerns have been expressed by investors, NGOs 
and others that trade associations do not represent their member companies’ 
views and interests well when engaging with climate policy. The investor we 
spoke to attributed this to a lack of clarity on the decision-making process used 
by trade associations on climate policy issues, stating that 
“it’s not always clear whether it’s a majority or whether it’s consensus, whether 
there’s a sub-committee, which essentially is... the driver of the policy activity, 
core trade associations, the extent to which they consult members... how they 
prioritise, etc. And I think that may give them an appearance of greater influence 
than they should have … is it in fact the entire sector who tell you something or is 
it certain companies within that sector who, for example, want the status quo to 
continue, whereas other players would be quite happy with a change in policy or 
a tightening of the regulation or whatever it might be.”
The trade association representatives we spoke to rejected these criticisms, and 
emphasised the leading role of member companies in the formulation of their 
plans and policies; one stated “Anything we do is agreed by the membership…
everything starts from meetings with members and every position we have is 
developed from there”. Another said “Let’s be clear: I do what I do because it’s 
what the members want done; I give the members an early warning about what’s 
coming. I am realistic to them in my advice about what is attainable, positively or 
negatively. I listen to, aggregate and occasionally prod their views. And then I go 
out and represent them, yes.”
Trade associations are structured in a variety of different ways, and the 
mechanisms they use to represent their members vary a great deal. Reasons for 
these variations highlighted by the people we interviewed include the nature of 
the association’s membership, whether it is homogeneous or heterogeneous (i.e. 
from one industrial sector or many, with companies of different sizes or mostly 
large firms) and whether there are a large or small number of members, with 
members from one country or many countries.  A strong central secretariat or a 
more dispersed structure can also impact on how members are consulted. 
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7.1 How do trade associations lobbying on climate policy in the EU 
collate, reconcile and represent their member companies’ views?
Common mechanisms used by trade associations to gather the views of member 
companies include working groups, conferences, consultation on wording of 
letters and position papers, email correspondence and forums. Some operate 
open structures; for example, one of the trade associations stated that “we have 
different committees and task forces for each different topic… once we decide 
this topic is coming up at EU level we should decide how the industry positions 
itself and what the industry [has] to say on this specific topic and whoever 
from the members want to take part from this specific task force or committee 
can decide to join.” Others have strong central leadership and chairing. The 
representative of a utility company we interviewed thought it was pragmatic for 
some trade associations to have strong central organisation: “A lot of the time it’s 
because they fast-track things because they have a very centralised secretariat 
and because if they didn’t, it would be an absolute nightmare for them because 
it’s just impossible. Right, canvas views of three and a half thousand people… 
they have a much more centralised structure.”
7.2 Broadness vs. specificity of positions
Many of the trade associations we spoke to acknowledged the difficulties 
of reaching consensus views on issues. One stated that “on some issues my 
membership have quite mature, firm – determined even – and nearly unanimous 
views, and on others they are still doing their thinking”. Another trade association 
representative said it is most comfortable when it can produce unanimity on an 
issue, and commented that “Some of the more recently established associations 
have quite strong majority rule but are much more relaxed about majority/
minority positions… We define it as close to unanimity as we can get. So on 
our official position papers …there’s basically always a footnote that says 
‘[organisation] does not agree with the position stated on this paper.’”
Several of the interviewees we talked to noted the tendency of trade associations 
to opt for a broad position. One of the representatives of an NGO noted “it is 
certainly an obvious point to make about trade associations, they make them 
fairly general points, which are often least common denominator, and are kind 
of meant to be framing for their general positions but don’t often get into a lot of 
detail and their main job is to prevent something happening rather than starting 
something happening.”
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7.3 Consensus and dissent within trade associations
While companies sometimes expressed their dissent from their trade association’s 
positions on climate policy within internal association forums (i.e. privately), 
others have opted to express their difference of opinion publicly. Some of 
the companies responding to CDP’s information request publicly stated their 
differences of opinion with their trade associations on climate policy (see quotes 
from Coca-Cola, Unilever and ArcelorMittal in Chapter 6). Companies may also 
resort to other tactics to undermine a trade association message or to resolve 
internal disagreements or power struggles. One representative of an NGO that 
we interviewed said that “I can think of one case where a trade association was 
going to, I think it was a letter they were going to send and because there was 
a debate about it, it got pulled before it got sent.  And somebody leaked it to us 
before it was sent and for all we know, that fact also got known and so they felt 
uncomfortable sending it but obviously there was a combination of things going 
on there… somebody actually leaking it to the NGOs as a way of expressing 
their displeasure so there must be a certain amount of tussling going on behind 
the scenes.”
7.4 Dominant companies within associations
Several of the interviewees noted that particular associations were dominated by 
big companies. One trade association representative said of their membership 
“inevitably the big companies have the most manpower and are the ones 
present. Many of them have their own rep offices here in Brussels”. A utility 
company we interviewed said that resources impacted on a company’s ability 
to monitor an association’s activities, as “smaller companies can’t even ensure 
that national trade bodies are saying something so how are they maintaining the 
national trade associations are feeding into the European trade associations?  It 
takes a lot of resource to monitor all of that information and in reality, it costs 
money and it costs resources”.
The dominance of particular companies and their interchangeability with their 
trade association was criticised by the representatives of NGOs. One said that 
“for years we had a kind of formal co-operation with [name of company], which 
is the biggest member and then occasionally we’d be suddenly in a room where 
they were [industry trade association].  You know what I mean about these 
different hats?” Another noted that “It’s kind of fluid you know. There are people 
that will one day be representing trade associations. The next day they will be 
representing their own company and after that they’ll be representing some of the 
hybrid kind of initiatives and that happens all the time.”
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Other interviewees stated that particularly engaged and active companies 
(or representatives of companies who are compelling speakers) could have 
a significant impact on the agenda of trade associations. A former aide to 
an MEP said that “The way BUSINESSEUROPE works is they have specific 
working groups on different issues and they’re lead by certain companies …
the companies that are most interested are the ones that have the biggest 
voice.” An NGO staff member backed this up, saying that “the details of policy 
positions by BUSINESSEUROPE are decided in working groups.  And for climate 
and energy policies it is the working group on the industrial policy section of 
BUSINESSEUROPE and because of that institutional arrangement, it’s mainly 
energy-intensive companies that have the experts sitting in that group… and these 
are people that are there already for years.”
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8 Conclusion
Climate change presents a range of risks and opportunities for businesses, including  
those presented by the introduction of policies to mitigate climate change, and robust 
regulation of polluting companies. Companies operating in the EU have recognised that 
trade associations can be a powerful tool for influencing policymakers, and are utilising 
them to engage with EU climate policy. It is clear that for better or worse, companies and 
their trade associations are actively engaging with policymakers to try and mould EU 
climate policy.
The trade associations profiled in this report use a variety of tools and tactics to influence 
climate policy. The formal and informal relationships they have established with 
policymakers provide them with a very powerful tool for shaping the policy agenda. 
Leading trade associations are intervening at the very beginning of the policy process 
by putting forward policy proposals to the Commission; they are then able to intervene 
in every subsequent stage of the policy process by commissioning research evidence, 
providing technical detail to shape policy, briefing journalists, running events, sending 
formal letters and ensuring that their member companies (and other stakeholders) 
are brought in to influence decision makers at key points in the policy process. The 
depth of their engagement with the EU policy process is both impressive and (to some 
commentators) a source of serious concern.
In particular, the energy-intensive industry lobbies, producers of fossil fuels and  
broad-based trade associations (such as BUSINESSEUROPE) are all actively engaging 
with policymakers on various climate policy issues, utilising a range of arguments  
about competitiveness and the risk of ‘carbon leakage’ – and these trade associations  
are having an impact on issues including the targets in the EU 2030 climate and  
energy  framework, the carbon leakage allowances and even the structure of the 
European Commission.
There is some evidence of misalignment between companies and their trade associations, 
with high profile departures of member companies from controversial trade associations, 
including Unilever leaving BUSINESSEUROPE, and prominent tech companies leaving 
ALEC in the US. The US President Barack Obama recently said ’There’s a huge gap 
between the professed values and visions of corporate CEOs and how their lobbyists 
operate in Washington. And I’ve said this to various CEOs… my challenge to them 
consistently is, is your lobbyist working as hard on those issues as he or she is on 
preserving that tax break that you’ve got? And if the answer is no, then you don’t care 
about it as much as you say’ (Economist, 2014). But equally, this report has highlighted 
numerous examples of companies working hand-in-hand with their trade associations on 
various climate policy issues – sometimes interchanging staff, with companies standing 
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in for trade associations at key meetings. While some businesses are engaging 
positively to support the development of effective climate policy, other companies 
are either (intentionally or unintentionally) obstructing the development of climate 
policy via their trade associations – sometimes at the same time as nominally 
supporting sustainability initiatives elsewhere. 
The important role of companies in European climate policy is unlikely to change 
any time soon. As CDP recently stated, ’Like it or not, the strong role of corporate 
influence in political decision-making is a reality’ (Levick, 2014). Given the 
huge challenges posed to the EU and countries around the world by climate 
change, it is most important to ensure that companies are pushing for effective 
climate policies that help to mitigate the effects of climate change. As Christiana 
Figueres, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, stated in 2011 while addressing a business audience: “There 
is a serious group of companies that have a voice that is much louder, that is 
better funded, and that operates much more in unison and that is still stuck in 
the technologies and the fuels of yesterday... From our perspective what we 
really need from visionary companies such as all of you is to have a very active 
engagement with the policymakers who decide the policy at home and the 
international policy” (Figueres, 2011). This puts the onus back onto companies 
(and the investors that own them) to ensure that the trade associations that they 
are supporting are lobbying on EU climate policy, in a way that is clearly aligned 
with the long-term interests of those companies, the economy and the climate.
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Future research topics
This report has focused on the positions of trade associations, but research 
into the positions and direct influence of large multinational companies on 
EU climate policy would be useful. Furthermore, the alignment of companies 
with the lobbying activities conducted by their trade associations could 
usefully be investigated in far greater depth. During interviews, the influence 
of businesses and their trade associations on national governments (who in 
turn influence EU climate policy) was mentioned several times, but would 
require a separate project to investigate thoroughly.
This short research project allowed exploration of the positions of 8 
prominent trade associations in the EU, but there are many more groups 
whose positions and influence on EU climate policy could be usefully 
investigated. This includes:
• Cembureau
•  International Air Transport Association (IATA)
• International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
• Euracoal
• Glass Alliance Europe
• Biotechnology Industry Organisation (BIO)
• Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA)
• Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP)
• European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA)
• European Union of the Natural Gas Industry (Eurogas)
•  International Chamber of Commerce
• International Fertilizer Industry Association
• International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation 
Association (IPIECA)
• The European Roundtable of Industrialists
• American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union
• European Energy Forum
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Annex 1 – Quotations from trade association consultation responses to two key EU 
consultations (December 2012 to July 2013)
Trade Association Profile – BUSINESSEUROPE
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “Europe has to put cost-competitiveness, security of supply and climate objectives on an equal footing.”
Targets “The EU should set a single 2030 emissions reduction target to incentivise investments in low-carbon  
and energy-efficient technologies. Due to their overlapping scope with the EU ETS, the EU targets for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy sources should not be continued after 2020.”
International climate agreement “BUSINESSEUROPE strongly supports global efforts to reduce emissions and urges governments and 
the European Commission to achieve an ambitious international climate agreement in 2015. Whatever 
the outcome of the international climate negotiations in 2015, the EU should set a binding 2030 
emissions reduction target. However, to avoid the negative consequences of unilateral decisions, the EU 
should take into account the outcome of the negotiations on this agreement when deciding on the most 
appropriate level of ambition.”
EU ETS “A strong ETS should be the main instrument to reduce emissions for industry and other covered  
sectors and to promote investments in low carbon technologies.”
Innovation and  
technology development
“A strong, coordinated and focused European energy and low-carbon technology programme  
is urgently needed. It should upgrade the existing research, development, demonstration and  
innovation (R&D&I) frameworks at EU and national level.”
Energy sources “Europe needs determination to explore and exploit, in a sustainable manner, potentially highly 
advantageous unconventional energy resources such as shale gas.”
Internal energy market “Fostering the completion of the internal energy market through full implementation of the Third  
Energy Package and the development of energy infrastructure as well as cross-border electricity  
and gas interconnection must be a priority.”
Industrial competitiveness “To ensure political commitment and actions, targets to address the energy price differential  
with major competitors and to ensure energy security should be introduced.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “Similarly, all the options proposed within the “Report on the state of the European carbon market in 
2012” are only short-term measures that would not provide a comprehensive solution which would 
stimulate long-term growth and investment in Europe.”
Policy objectives “Business has called for a stable, predictable legislative framework which is indispensable for  
business’ investments.”
“Short-term measures, such as the ETS “backloading” proposal are opposed by BUSINESSEUROPE  
as they undermine the regulatory predictability through to 2020”
Carbon leakage and European 
competitiveness
“Many European businesses – often the most CO2 efficient in their class – compete globally, so it is  
vital that sectors at risk of carbon leakage are adequately supported on an evidence-based basis. This 
means ensuring that the free allowance system is working effectively and also considering new options 
for better supporting European industry going forward such as the recycling of auctioning revenues.”
“Short-term measures, such as the ETS “backloading” proposal are opposed by BUSINESSEUROPE 
as they undermine the regulatory predictability through to 2020 as established under the EU ETS and 
further deteriorate the global competitiveness of Europe.”
International climate agreement “BUSINESSEUROPE opposes any unilateral increase of the emission reduction target for 2020 unless 
other industrialized countries assume comparable emission reductions and developing countries put  
in place measures to fight climate change with their respective capacities.”
Technology development “Forward-looking industrial policy must give priority to boosting research and innovation to develop 
technologies enabling emissions reductions in all sectors. This can best be achieved by improving  
the research and innovation legal framework and providing adequate financing to EU programmes.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform
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Trade Association Profile – Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “The next policy cycle can only but focus on bringing jobs, saving pensions, creating growth, preventing 
further social unrest and keeping Europe together.”
“Without a strong industrial policy, climate targets make no sense. So far industrial policy has been  
laid down in policy documents only, where climate policy has resulted in legislation. This situation  
needs a rebalance.”
Targets “A single EU-wide CO2 target brings the most cost-effective economic solution. As options become less 
available and more expensive, having additional efficiency and renewables targets reduces Member 
States’ flexibility, thus inducing unnecessary costs. Multiple targets interfere with the member states fuel 
mix choice – which is a national competence. Policies interfering with the functioning of the ETS and the 
carbon market should be removed.”
International climate agreement “All efforts need to be directed towards a global agreement that leads to comparable burdens for 
competing industrial installations around the world.”
EU ETS “[CEPI believes in] EU ETS as a central tool in a global level playing field for industry”
Innovation and  
technology development
“To be able to act on climate change, the focus has to be on technology development. The EU needs to 
promote breakthrough technology development in industrial processes, in projects, pilots, demo’s and 
implementation. For this the funding, structure and political system are missing.”
Energy sources “The development and use of low carbon technologies requires investments from industry in Europe.  
Any policy package needs to take this into account.”
Internal energy market “[CEPI believes in] completion of the energy markets.”
Industrial competitiveness “Europe needs a comprehensive package [including] an industrial policy target”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “CEPI calls upon the European Commission and member states to thoroughly think through structural 
changes to the EU ETS, instead of a short time fix.”
Policy objectives “To give investment certainty there should be no further changes to the system that are implemented 
before 2020. 2013 already sees a planned massive overhaul of the EU ETS with new allocation 
rules. 2014 already has uncertainty with the proposed re-evaluation of free allocation to the industry 
(the carbon leakage list). The back-loading proposal changes the rules again, announcing even more 
changes ahead.
Regulatory uncertainty becomes a barrier to investments in the EU.”
Carbon leakage and European 
competitiveness
“Retiring allowances from the market pushes carbon and electricity prices upwards. This means 
increasing compliance costs and energy costs. At a time where Europe is far from recovery from the 
financial crisis, with difficult access to capital, with the energy prices gap growing between Europe 
and the rest of the world, retiring allowances will stop investments, push for the relocation of industries 
outside Europe, and exacerbate the impact of the financial crisis for EU citizens.”
“CEPI is firmly against further efforts to manipulate the carbon price. These measures would substantially 
alter the nature and functioning of the ETS and would require complex institutional changes. It goes 
without saying that a price floor would require also a price cap. And these would have to take into 
consideration the impact on competitiveness that carbon pricing has on the whole range of sectors 
covered by the ETS.”
International climate agreement “We have understood that the EU target of 20% only moves to 30% when an international binding 
climate change agreement is reached. As these pre-requisites are not there, the Commission would be 
exceeding its powers if it would propose to increase the 2020 target to -30% within the context of the 
EU ETS review.”
“Changes to the linear reduction factor for industry can only start after 2020 and only when either a 
global agreement is reached or significant breakthrough technologies become available.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform 
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Trade Association Profile – Eurelectric
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives EURELECTRIC puts forward a clear message that current policies will not deliver affordability, 
sustainability or security of supply..
Targets “[EURELECTRIC calls for] an economy-wide 2030 emissions reduction target of at least 40% compared 
to 1990, in line with the Commission’s Low-carbon Economy Roadmap 2050”
“A technology neutral approach must be adopted in meeting the agreed targets.”
“A strengthened ETS will support robust deployment of mature renewables and supply-side energy 
efficiency. Adding further European targets per technology objective would risk a continued reliance 
on multiple instruments, with an adverse impact on costs. Targets for renewables and energy efficiency 
should at most be indicative and should only be decided after thorough analysis of their impact on the 
headline emissions reduction target.”
International climate agreement “…in order to be globally successful, climate action needs to be a collective endeavour. EURELECTRIC 
therefore urges the Commission to work towards a balanced, deliverable global response in the 
international climate negotiations.”
EU ETS “[EURELECTRIC calls for] a strengthened ETS as the key instrument for driving investment choice in low-
carbon technologies, infrastructure and processes”
Innovation and  
technology development
“EU public funding for power sector RD&D and incentives for private investment along the whole 
innovation value chain should be increased in line with the challenges and opportunities of low-carbon 
technologies, infrastructure and processes.”
Internal energy market “[EURELECTRIC calls for] a re-commitment by EU decision-makers to the completion of the internal 
energy market;”
Industrial competitiveness “Having identified and chosen the ETS carbon market as the most cost-effective instrument, the EU should 
resolve problems of industrial competitiveness within that framework: EURELECTRIC firmly opposes any 
splitting of the ETS into separate sectoral schemes.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
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Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “We strongly regret that the structural options outlined in the report are not explicitly linked to a clear 
process of decisions on a post-2020 climate and energy framework.”
“EURELECTRIC looks to the European Commission to urgently bring forward a coherent top- down 
package of proposals which:
– Establish an ambitious, firm, long-term, economy-wide greenhouse gas reduction target for 2030  
up to 2050, in line with the European Council goal”
Policy objectives “EURELECTRIC has therefore assessed the six structural options outlined in the carbon market report in 
relation to two objectives:
– Securing the long-term role of the ETS as the key driver policy for carbon reduction in an EU 2030 
climate and energy package; 
– Maintaining the credibility of the ETS in the short-term before 2020.
On this basis, EURELECTRIC gives highest priority to option (c) for an early revision of the annual 
linear reduction factor in line with a 2030 target. We envisage that a revised linear factor coming into 
effect before 2020 would ned to be increased in the range of 2.3% dependent on the economy-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals and burden sharing between the ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
Option (b) to retire EUAs in phase 3 is seen as subsidiary to option (c) because it does not provide a 
long-term signal, but recognising that revision of the linear factor cannot take effect immediately, some 
EURELECTRIC members consider that a retirement is necessary to re-establish market confidence in a 
relatively short time. EURELECTRIC members agree that any retirement in phase 3 should be integrated 
into a subsequent revision of the linear factor in order to bring the retirement into alignment with the 
2030 target.
EURELECTRIC also firmly favours option (d) for the extension of the scope of the ETS to other sectors 
because this is consistent with the goal of cost-effective economy-wide carbon reductions and the 
completion of the harmonised internal energy market. We take note that both Australia and California 
include additional sectors in their carbon markets, and we call on the Commission to undertake a 
detailed assessment of the feasibility of extending the scope of the ETS for phase 4.”
Carbon leakage and  
European competitiveness
“We remind the Commission that it is not the ETS, but rather taxes and the burden of expensive 
renewables subsidy policies that are today causing electricity costs to rise, and that current renewables 
subsidies deliver emissions reductions at several times the cost of the same reductions if they were 
delivered through the ETS. This has a damaging impact on the whole economy because these costs 
affect all businesses and al residents. Meanwhile on-going policy uncertainty due to a weak ETS and 
the lack of a target beyond 2020 means that the European electricity sector is un-investable, and our 
sector is experiencing its own problem of global competition: instead of investing to replace old power 
generation and grids in Europe, EU-based electric utilities are becoming international and are investing 
elsewhere in the world. A stronger ETS can help to solve both of these problems.”
International climate agreement “With international negotiations in the UNFCC proceeding slowly, showing the world that the EU 
remains committed to a long-term strategy of driving carbon reduction through a strong ETS is crucial to 
securing a global level playing field in climate action.”
“EURELECTRIC believes that the ETS can and should be the key driver policy for carbon reduction in an 
EU 2030 climate and energy package. EURELECTRIC also believes that a rebalancing of supply and 
demand in ETS is needed in order for the carbon price to remain integral to business operations and 
investment decisions, through to 2020 and beyond.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform 
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Trade Association Profile – Eurofer 
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Targets “In order to avoid distortions in the internal market and make sure the climate objectives are reached 
in a cost-effective way, targets should be set EU-wide and structured around an harmonized policy 
framework.”
“…targets for the industry should not be binding but take into consideration technological development. 
In that sense, emission reduction pathways for the steel industry should be built ‘bottom-up’ which means 
they need to be based on abatement levels which are technically and economically feasible, irrespective 
of the overall cap. 
Furthermore, inefficiencies stemming from overlapping policies, in particular the interaction between the 
CO2, the renewable energy and the energy efficiency targets, must be addressed.”
International climate agreement “Targets should not be set unilaterally but in the context of a joint effort by developed and developing 
nations, ideally within the framework of an international agreement.”
“Future policies should introduce some degree of flexibility like for example making the EU climate 
targets conditional to the signature of a global climate agreement and take into consideration 
technological development.”
EU ETS “The recent backloading proposal and the discussion about structural measures to reinforce the EU ETS 
pre-2020 is a recipe for disaster, scaring away investments.”
Innovation and technology 
development
“EU research and innovation policies (FP7, Horizon 2020, structural funds, national initiatives...)  
are too fragmented and nearly entirely geared to support end-product technologies but not  
process technologies.”
Energy sources “The EU must adopt a looking-forward strategy to exploit unconventional fuels in a sustainable way. 
Unjustified regulatory restrictions on the exploration and production of these fuels should be avoided.”
Internal energy market “EU research and innovation policies (FP7, Horizon 2020, structural funds, national initiatives...)  
are too fragmented and nearly entirely geared to support end-product technologies but not  
process technologies.”
Industrial competitiveness “In order to ensure an EU strong industrial strategy, the 20% GDP target for industry should be extended 
beyond 2020 and become part of the 2030 set of objectives.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
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Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “EUROFER is opposed to any measure that would either increase the 2020 target and/or boost up 
carbon and power prices. Given the investments required and the corresponding lead times, the time 
horizon is too short for such measures to have meaningful effects on the steel sector. On the contrary, the 
proposals will drive up power prices and ETS compliance costs, consequently weakening the competitive 
position of the industry.”
“Against this background, EUROFER wishes to insist that any anticipated increase of the EU ETS 2020 
emission target or increase in the carbon price would create an unjustified supplementary burden on the 
EU economy and in particular the steel industry.”
Policy objectives “Options a, b and c are equivalent to a reduction of the cap. EUROFER is opposed to such a decision. 
The 2020 Climate and Energy Package makes it clear that any strengthening of the target has to be 
conditional to similar efforts by third countries. It is unlikely that there will be any legally binding global 
agreement entering into force before 2020. Therefore globally distortive direct and indirect CO2 costs 
will continue to weigh on energy-intensive industries until then.”
“EU prosperity relies on a strong, competitive, energy and resource efficient industrial base. That’s why 
EUROFER is convinced that an unbiased re-cast of the EU climate and energy policy is required in order 
to meet long term ambitious mitigation objectives whilst maintaining at the same time a decent level of 
competitiveness of our economy. A quick fix to the EU ETS is not the answer”
Carbon leakage and  
European competitiveness
“In other words the technologies involved under too ambitious reduction targets will demand huge 
and sustained risky investments while at the same time increasing operating costs without giving any 
competitive advantage to industry, should the EU adopt such targets unilaterally. Unlike investments in 
energy efficient technologies or process control which can be paid back after a limited period of time, 
the breakthrough technologies under consideration for the steel sector will, if implemented, deteriorate 
the competitive position of the EU steel industry.”
“Repeated piecemeal intervention discredits the EU ETS and turn away investors. The industry needs 
planning certainty.”
“Higher carbon prices will inevitably result in higher power prices. This will damage the competitiveness 
of electricity-intensive industries (in particular the Electric Arc Furnace steelmaking route based on steel 
recycling) and increase their exposure to carbon leakage.”
International climate agreement “Climate policies made in isolation from the rest of the world and leading to unilateral cost increases will 
not put the EU economy on track towards a cost-effective decarbonisation.”
“Until a comprehensive global agreement on climate change ensuring a level playing field is achieved, 
such a reform needs to be designed so as to protect the manufacturing value chains in Europe.”
Technology development “it is technically not feasible for the sector to meet the current pathway enshrined in the EU ETS of 21% 
CO2 reduction by 2020 and of 34 to 40% by 2030 (meaning 43-48% CO2 reduction by 2030 for the 
ETS sector)”
“It must rely on measures which are technically feasible and economically viable for the  
sectors involved.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform 
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Trade Association Profile – Eurometaux 
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “Major EU internal and international developments require Europe to re-balance its objectives… 
The focus cannot simply be on climate change and energy alone; it should also cover industrial policy, 
competitiveness, taxes, trade, competition policy and innovation.”
Targets “Eurometaux proposes the following: 
A. Legally binding climate targets for CO2 emission reductions should be accompanied by legally 
binding compensation to carbon leakage exposed industries, arising from direct and indirect costs due 
to the EU/ETS, based on actual production. 
B. Additional costs for renewable production or energy efficiency should be accompanied by measures 
securing the competitiveness of carbon leakage exposed industries (support schemes, grid costs, etc.) 
State aid rules must be adjusted to allow for a general exemption of such costs for these industries.”
“Coherence can be ensured by putting climate targets on an equal footing with industrial 
competitiveness.”
International climate agreement “New policies have to be linked with equal commitments from other global competitors in the form of 
international binding agreements to provide equivalent conditions for companies competing globally. In 
the meantime, electro-intensive trade exposed industry in Europe should be shielded from the impact of 
EU policies that impact competitiveness.”
EU ETS “Should the EU continue to price CO2 emissions associated with industrial production then the ETS 
should be maintained as the primary, market-based incentive to reduce emissions for industry and other 
sectors concerned.”
“Ensuring a predictable long-term legislative framework with no interventions during the trading period – 
we propose to extend the trading period to 10-15 years.”
Innovation & technology 
development
“The EU can increase innovation capacity by a stable and predictable regulatory framework allowing 
for investments in new technologies and processes. This can be supported by EU funding mechanisms 
dedicated to industrial large-scale demonstration projects.”
Energy sources Allow for the deployment of all energy sources, enabling competitive prices.”
Industrial competitiveness Binding measures for industrial competitiveness, to secure 20% of GDP in industrial activity by 2020, 
must be strengthened until a global level-playing field is achieved.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “The options listed in the carbon market report will only provide a quick fix for EU ETS by tightening 
the market balance. To avoid similar situations later on, the EU ETS needs deep structural reform, and 
Eurometaux calls upon the European Commission and members states to allow sufficient time for a 
proper and informed debate on real structural reform, focusing on the structure of post-2020 ETS.”
“EU climate policy should be aligned with the Commission’s goal of increasing industry’s share in the EU 
GDP to 20% by 2020.”
Carbon leakage and European 
competitiveness
“Eurometaux strongly feels that an ETS review needs to bring a structural solution to the EU’s competitive 
position.”
“…we very much doubt that a global climate agreement will assure a homogenous global carbon cost 
and a level playing field. All other emissions trading systems world-wide are, in most cases, designed 
as stand-alone systems with strong in-built protection of domestic industries. Linking ETS to other carbon 
schemes therefore requires scrutiny in order to ensure symmetry and reciprocity in terms of privileges 
and burdens on the industry on a global scale.”
“EU ETS was designed without any alternative planning with adequate long-term carbon leakage 
prevention measures. Consequently, the European non-ferrous metals industries, as well as other energy-
intensive industries in Europe, are now fighting for their survival, carrying significant extra cost burdens 
in carbon and energy costs. “Back-loading” and other ad hoc measure to measure the balance of the 
EUA market will exacerbate the problems for industry without rectifying the weakness of the EU ETS.”
International climate agreement “The EU ETS functions well as a trading market and the goal of reducing GHG emissions by 20% 
by 2020 compared to the 1990 level is met. Options to tighten the EU ETS market should only be 
considered for the next trading period after 2020 on the basis of a global agreement on the UNFCCC 
in December 2015.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform 
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Trade Association Profile – European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic)
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “Europe will be successful in designing a sustainable 2030 framework if it properly considers the three 
main objectives: security and stability of energy supply; globally cost-competitive energy prices and 
environmental aspects to tackle negative externalities.”
Targets “[We ask the Commission to] apply a realistic climate approach: Set a top-down climate target 
conditionally only in case of a substantial global agreement with comparable burdens for industry 
worldwide. In the absence of a global agreement provide bottom-up calculations to define a realistic, 
cost-efficient range for a climate goal, taking scenarios into account.”
“[We ask the Commission to] introduce a target to reduce the cost of renewable energy by a certain % 
instead of requiring a proportion of renewable energy.”
“The three targets overlap and conflict. The renewables target and the energy efficiency target for 2020 
are driving efforts that tend to reduce the demand for carbon allowances under the ETS. Accordingly, 
these abatement effects outside the ETS are leading to higher economic carbon costs. Costly abatement 
options often need long-term subsidy support that is affecting energy costs - these represent a 
misallocation of resources and cause economic losses.”
International climate agreement See above
EU ETS “[We ask the Commission to] support ETS beyond 2020: Structural changes must be made to  
maintain ETS as a market based system, introducing more flexibility and avoiding short-term fixes  
like backloading.”
Innovation and technology 
development
“[We ask the Commission to] focus on innovation: Build on sector specific knowledge and ability  
to innovate.”
Energy sources “[We ask the Commission to] diversify and use all energy sources…The development of unconventional 
energy sources including shale gas is also increasingly important.”
Internal energy market “[We ask the Commission to] drive full implementation of 3rd energy package and the completion  
of the internal energy market”
Industrial competitiveness “[We ask the Commission to] enable economic growth: Inclusion of a 20% of industry share in GDP by 
2020 and beyond & no absolute energy consumption cap which threatens growth perspectives.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
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Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “The Commission’s short-term ETS ‘quick-fix’ options for before 2020 are narrow, alleged choices only 
label differently same but counterproductive EU target inflation: Unilaterally increasing the EU’s GHG 
targets by removing allowances in different ways will not solve structural EU policy flaws.”
“The EU ETS must not be turned upside down into an instrument pushing up the EU carbon price in 
order to extract resources for increasing government revenues or for subsidising most costly abatement 
technologies. Too many policy objectives will weaken the ETS efficiency.”
“The introduction of a price floor and the introduction of a price management reserve would change the 
current ETS system entirely: Currently the carbon price can be formed freely according to the predefined 
allowances quantity and supply and demand at the lowest possible cost. These price-determining 
mechanisms would turn the carbon market into a tax-like instrument prone to political – possibly arbitrary 
– intervention. There are no criteria for the “right” carbon price either.”
Policy objectives “Investment decisions for until 2020 have already been made in economically difficult times – relying on 
the current regulatory framework’s stability.”
“In line with the standing EU climate policy position Cefic is against a unilateral increase of the EU 
reduction target, ie. in the absence of comparable commitments and burdens around the globe.”
“Retiring of allowances even exceeds the current EC ‘backloading’ proposal. Cefic opposes strictly both 
backloading and retiring.”
Carbon leakage and European 
competitiveness
“Due to the lack of a functioning power market across Europe and due to a lack of competition with 
other suppliers from outside the EU, the EU power industry can pass on carbon costs to the consumers. 
This affects the competitiveness of i.e. power-intensive sectors such as the chemical industry (that cannot 
pass on such EU extra costs) and thus affects the low-carbon efficiency of the scheme (increased risk and 
likelihood of carbon leakage).”
“EC fixes instead increase European companies’ regulatory risk, increase their exposure to EU’s energy 
cost handicap and carbon leakage risk leading to net GHG emission increases globally, accelerate loss 
of EU manufacturing and employment.”
“Cefic rejects the idea of an intervention in the ETS in phase 3 i.e. in the absence of a global climate 
policy agreement. Such intervention would not improve but directly worsen the measures against carbon 
leakage without any environmental need. Moreover the absolute reduction path is not matched to 
economic activity, which could lead to investment leakage, even for the most sustainable and innovative 
production routes.”
“The assessment of the Carbon Leakage List each five years creates uncertainty and an unnecessary risk 
for industry. A sudden significant drop in the allocation volume threatens maintenance investments of 
existing installation needed to stay in Europe and threatens the needed investments in new production 
capacity so much needed for the recovery of the economy.
International climate agreement “Short-term, arbitrary market interventions and measures as proposed by the Commission within the 
third trading period before 2020 fall short of providing the appropriate framework in a world of global 
competition also in a continued absence of a globally agreed, equitable climate policy.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural reform 
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Trade Association Profile – FuelsEurope (formerly EUROPIA)
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “EUROPIA agrees with the trio of energy and climate policy objectives. We believe that trade-offs 
among these objectives must be openly addressed, and the current emphasis of policies re-balanced: 
future policy choices should ensure that equal weight is given to all three objectives.”
Targets “The main focus of future climate policy should be on emissions reduction as opposed to setting specific 
targets for the energy mix and for energy consumption. EUROPIA calls on the EU to adopt a single, 
transparent, cost-effective, long-term trajectory for carbon abatement, which is shared economy-wide 
and accepted by society.”
“EUROPIA is against sectoral targets for different segments of the industry, as they would increase the 
complexity of the scheme, make its administration even more complex and could create competitive 
disadvantages between sectors where products can substitute each other.”
“EUROPIA does not support the current multiple and overlapping target regime, nor targets for 
renewables post 2020, particularly if they overlap with the central carbon abatement mechanism;”
International climate agreement “The level of ambition of any target should be set in a transparent way and should take into account 
the differing pace of commitments by other countries, in order to ensure that EU competitiveness 
is maintained….Currently, the ETS Directive is not explicit on what would constitute an acceptable 
“International Agreement” and on the criteria to assess its consistency with the EU regulations.”
EU ETS “EUROPIA members support emissions trading as a cost-effective market mechanism for emissions 
reduction, in the power and industry sector. An appropriate market-based compensation scheme must 
remain in place to protect EU industry from carbon leakage effects… Policy measures that overlap with 
the scheme should be reviewed.”
Innovation and  
technology development
“We recognise the need to support R&D to bring promising low-carbon technologies to the market, 
but all energy sources should be integrated into the market under normal market conditions, without 
subsidies as soon as possible. In fact, production subsidies8 for all fuels should be phased out.”
Energy sources “EUROPIA believes that economically and environmentally sustainable biofuels may play a significant 
role in the future of transport. We therefore supports the development of cost effective advanced 
biofuels, i.e. those biofuels that are nonfood & feed competing, sustainable and beneficial in terms of 
lifecycle greenhouse gas emission.”
Internal energy market “Rigorous enforcement of the third energy package into national laws is necessary and regular reporting 
on the implementation can be a good tool for assessing the contribution to security of supply.”
Industrial competitiveness “International or Member State level trade barriers or other protectionist measures are by no means the 
right answers to preserve industrial competitiveness. Market rationalisation must be allowed to happen 
where appropriate, without national interventions, and state aid rules should be applied uniformly 
across the EU.”
“Regarding the other objectives of the EU energy policy, namely competitiveness and security of supply, 
EUROPIA does not consider that binding targets are necessarily the best instrument to promote them.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “Discretionary price management is particularly controversial because the carbon price mechanism 
could become more a product of administrative and political decisions, than a result of the interplay of 
market supply and demand. Setting a price floor or creating a carbon price reserve could also reduce 
the efficiency of the market, and would interfere with the market mechanism setting the price between 
supply and demand.”
Policy objectives “Any structural adjustment of the ETS should address the longer term picture (i.e. post 2020) taking 
a broader view of climate, energy and industrial factors and in particular looking at global action. 
Therefore we regret that most of the proposed structural measures in the Commission’s report on  
‘The state of the European carbon market in 2012’ dated 14 November 2012 focus on short-term 
supply-demand adjustments and do not provide longer-term solutions.”
Carbon leakage and  
European competitiveness
“The EU has committed not to increase its target unilaterally until other developed countries commit 
themselves to comparable emission reductions, and economically more advanced developing countries 
contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities. Unilaterally 
increasing the EU’s CO2 reduction target will impact the competitive position of the EU economy without 
having any noticeable impact in terms of global CO2 mitigation.”
2. Evidence from consultation response to the proposed EU ETS structural refor
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Trade Association Profile – International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Policy objectives “We agree with the trio of climate and energy policy objectives: security of supply, sustainability  
and affordability of energy supporting industrial competitiveness and societal quality of life.  
OGP also believes that trade-offs among the objectives should be addressed openly, and the current  
emphasis needs to be re-balanced: future policy choices should ensure that adequate weight is given  
to all three objectives.”
Targets “In general, we favour EU-wide policy mechanisms and approaches as they underpin the internal market 
by reducing intra-EU trade distortions and thus support EU competitiveness… …we do not support 
further triple targets (greenhouse gas (GHG) / renewable energy sources (RES) / energy efficiency (EE), 
e.g. XX-XX-XX) for 2030 and believe the EU should set an overall climate ambition for 2030 based on a 
single GHG target”
“This target must take into account sound science, progress at the international climate negotiations, and 
reflect existing and future commitments of other major trading partners.”
International climate agreement “As part of a suitable international agreement the EU climate ambition for 2030 might be incorporated 
in binding international targets.”
EU ETS “[The EU ETS] should remain the central EU mechanism for CO2 emissions reduction for electricity and 
industrial sectors”
Innovation and technology 
development
“We also recognise the need to support R&D to bring promising low-carbon technologies to market,  
but all energy sources should be integrated into the market and allowed to compete under normal 
market conditions, without subsidies”
Energy sources “Within the 2030 energy and climate framework, natural gas should be enabled as a reliable and 
immediately available option to help meet emissions reduction target cost-effectively… Additionally, 
natural gas from shales is potentially an opportunity for Member States to further diversify their natural 
gas supply sources, while lowering overall GHG emissions and stimulating economic growth.”
Internal energy market “The Internal Energy Market needs to be completed as soon as possible in order to allow markets to 
deliver the most price-efficient solution.”
Industrial competitiveness “OGP does not consider targets as good instruments to promote or measure competitiveness and/or 
security of energy supply.”
1. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
Policy area/feature Evidence of position
Reaction to proposals “The proposed structural measures for the EU ETS do not specifically address emissions post 2020. We 
would welcome further proposals from the Commission that address the whole economy – including 
the ETS and non-ETS sectors – in the post 2020 context. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases is a 
societal challenge and the burden should not fall disproportionately on one part of the economy only.”
Policy objectives “Finally, any solution should take into account international developments and avoid exacerbating 
carbon leakage.”
2. Evidence from the consultation response to the Green Paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies
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Annex 2 – Companies and national trade associations that are members of prominent 
trade associations lobbying on EU climate policy
Corporate Advisory and Support Group 
BusinessEurope’s core membership is made up of national business federations from across 34 countries in Europe,  
but companies can also join as individual members. 
Accenture Adam Opel Ag Alcoa
Arcelormittal Areva BASF
British American Tobacco Bayer BMW
Bosch BP Europe Caterpillar
Daimler Diageo Dupont De Nemours
EDF ENEL Exxonmobil
Facebook Ford GDF Suez
General Electric Henkel Hitachi
Hyundai IBM Imperial Tobacco Group Ltd.
Infineon Technologies Austria Intel Corporation JTI (Japan Tobacco International)
KLM Lhoist Lukoil
Michelin Microsoft MSD (Europe) Inc.
Mytilineos NBC Universal OMV
Oracle Pfizer Philip Morris International
Philips Procter & Gamble Randstad
Renault Repsol Safran
Samsung Shell Siemens
Solvay Statoil TCS (Tata Consulting Service)
Telecom Italia Telefonica Thermo Fisher
Toshiba Total Toyota
UPS Veolia Volkswagen
1. BUSINESSEUROPE members (as of January 2015)
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National Trade Federations that are members of BUSINESSEUROPE
Below are the national business federations which are BUSINESSEUROPE’s direct members.
Alianta Confederatiilor Patronale din 
Romania – ACPR
ANIS – Associazione Nazionale Industria San 
Marino
Associaçáo Industrial Portuguesa – AIP
Bulgarian Industrial Association – Union of 
the Bulgarian Business – BIA
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. 
– BDI
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände e.V. – BDA
CIP Confederação Empresarial de Portugal Confederación Española de Organizaciones 
Empresariales – CEOE
Confederation of British Industry – CBI
Confederation of Danish Employers – DA Confederation of Danish Industry – DI Confederation of Finnish Industries – EK
Confederation of Industry of the Czech 




Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise – 
NHO
Confederazione Generale dell' Industria 
Italiana – CONFINDUSTRIA
Croatian Employers' Association (Croatian 
Association of Employers) – HUP
Cyprus Employers & Industrialists Federation 
– OEB
Estonian Employers' Confederation – ETTK
Fédération des Entreprises de Belgique – 
Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen 
– FEB-VBO
Fédération des entreprises suisses – 
Economiesuisse
Fedil – Business Federation Luxembourg
Hellenic Federation of Enterprises – SEV Ibec Industriellenvereinigung – IV
Latvijas Darba Deveju Konfederacija- 
Employers' Confederation of Latvia – LDDK
Lietuvos Pramonininkuc Konfederacijac- The 
Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists – LPK
Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise 
and Industry – MCCEI
MGYOSZ – BUSINESSHUNGARY 
(Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos 
Szövetsége)
Montenegrin Employers Federation – MEF 
(Unija poslodavaca Crne Gore – UPCG)
Mouvement des Entreprises de France – 
MEDEF
Polish Confederation Lewiatan Republikova Unia Zamestnavatelov (RUZ) SA – Business Iceland (Samtök atvinnulífsins)
Serbian Association of Employers – SAE 
(Unija poslodavaca Srbije – UPS)
SI – Federation of Icelandic Industries  
(Samtök id-nad-arins)
Svenskt Näringsliv (Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise) – SN
Swiss Employers Confederation Turkish Confederation of Employer 
Associations – TISK
Turkish Industry & Business Association  
– TÜSIAD
Vereniging VNO-NCW Združenje Delodajalcev Slovenije –  
ZDS (Employers' Association of Slovenia)
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2. CEFIC members (as of September 2014)




Cepsa Quimica Chemtura Chevron Phillips
Clariant Cristal Dow Europe
Dow Corning DSM E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company
Eastman Chemical Evonik Industries ExxonMobil Chemical Europe
FMC Foret Honeywell Huntsman (europe) bvba
ICL-IP Ineos International Chemical Investors SE – ICIG
Kemira oyj Kuraray Europe Lanxess
The Linde Group Lubrizol Lucite
Lyondellbasell Industries Mapei Merck KgaA
Mexichem Novartis Pharma AG OMV AG
Oxea Perstorp Procter & Gamble
Repsol Quimica S.A. Rio Tinto Sabic
Sandoz GmbH Sanofi-CHIMIE Socar Türkiye Istanbul
Shell Chemicals Solvay Styrolution
Styron Sumitomo Teva Pharmaceutical Industries ltd
Total Chimie Tvk (a company of mol) Unilever
Versalis spa Wacker Chemie
Corporate Members (ACOM)
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Federation Members (AFEM)
APDCR – Romanian Chemicals Producers 
and Distributors Association
APEQ – Associação Portuguesa das Empresas 
Químicas
Association of Lithuanian Chemical Industry 
Enterprises/Lietuvos Chemijos Pramones 
Imoniu Asociacija
Bulgarian Chamber of Chemical Industry/
Branshova Kamara na Turgovskite Drujestva 
ot Chimicheskata Promishlenost
CIA – Chemical Industries Association Essencia
FCIO – Fachverband der Chemischen 
Industrie Österreichs
Federation of Estonian Chemical Industries/
Eesti Keemiatoostuse Liit
FEDERCHIMICA – Federazione Nazionale 
dell'Industria Chimica
FEIQUE – Federacion Empresarial  
de la Industria Quimica Espanola
GZS – Chamber of Commerce and Industry  
of Slovenia Dimiceva
HACI – Hellenic Association of Chemical 
Industries
IKEM – Innovation and Chemical Industries 
in Sweden
KT RY – Kemianteollisuus ry MAVESZ – Hungarian Chemical Industry 
Association
Norsk Industri PharmaChemical Ireland PI – Procesindustrien
PIPC – Polish Chamber of Chemical Industry Russian Chemists Union SCHP – Association of Chemical Industry  
of the Czech Republic
Scienceindustries The Association of Latvian Chemical and 
Pharmaceutical Industry/Latvijas Kimijas Un 
Farmacijas Uznemeju Asociacija
TKSD – Turkish Chemical Manufacturers 
Association
UIC – Union des Industries Chimiques UKI – Association of Chemical Industry/
Udruzenje Kemijske Industrije
Ukrainian Chemists Union
VCI – Verband der Chemischen  
Industrie e.V.
VNCI – Vereniging van de Nederlandse 
Chemische Industrie
ZCHFP – Association of Chemical  
and Pharmaceutical Industry of the  
Slovak Republic / Zväz chemického  
a farmaceutického priemyslu Slovenskej 
republiky
AarhusKarlshamn Abwassertechnische Beraung- und 
Serviceburö Steding (ABS)
Acideka S.A.
Acorn Water Ltd Activa Addivant Ltd
Adisseo Advachem A-ESSE Fabrica Ossidi Di Zinco
Agriphar Air Products Chemicals Europe Airedale
Ajinomoto Eurolysine Ajinomoto Foods Ajinomoto OmniChem
Akcros Chemicals Akdeniz Chemicals Alberdingk Boley
Alder S.p.A. Alkim Alkali Kimya AllessaChemie
Almatis GmbH Alufluor AlzChem trostberg GmbH
Ambrogio Pagani Amcol Specialty Minerals Amcor Flexibles Europe
Anitox Arakawa Europe GmbH Arizona Chemical Company
Arran Chemical Arsol Aromatics Asturiana de Zinc
Asua Products Atlantic Copper Aurubis
Austrotherm Axens Azomures
Business Members (ABM)
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Babolna Bio Bachem SA Baerlocher
Balchem Corporation Befesa Zinc Sondika Belinka Perkemija
Bell Laboratories Berzelius Stolberg Bilbaina de Alquitranes
BIM Kemi BioMCN Bioxal
BK Giulini Bluestar Silicones France Bochemie
Bode Chemie Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma Boliden
Borregaard Bozzeto Giovanni Spa Bracco Imaging
Brenntag UK & ireland (Albion) Brüggemann Chemical Buckman Laboratories
Budenheim Iberica S.L.U. Bruchsaler Farbenfabrik GmbH & Co Byk Additives GmbH
CABB Cabot Caffaro
Calachem Ltd Caldic Chemie Cambrex Karlskoga
Campine CarboTech Carbogen AMCIS AG
Cargill Catalyst Recovery Europe (Porocel) Catena Additives
Celgene Chemicals Cerbios ChemCom Industries B.V
Chemie Kelheim GmbH Chemifloc Chemiplastica
Chemische Fabrik WIBARCO Chemisol Chemko
Chemson Chemviron Carbon Chevron Oronite
Chimica Dr. Fr. D'Agostino Chimica Pomponesco CH-Polymers OY
Christeyns Ciech Cinkarna
Citis sas Citrique Belge SA Climax Molybdenum
Clinty Chemicals Coagulantes Del Cinca SL Co.ge.fin.
Colorobbia Italia Compañia Minero Rio Tirón Contract Chemicals
Coplosa Corbion Cordenka Gmbh & Co. KG
CP KELCO Cremer Oleo GmbH Croda International
CropEnergies AG CU Chemie Uetikon CUF Quimicos Industriais
CWK Bad Köstritz Cytec Industries Dabeer
Daikin Industries LTD Daw Bytom DCC Maastricht BV
De Craene Delamine Derivados Del Fluor
Derivados Químicos Desotec DOG Deutsche Oelfabrik Gesellschaft  für chemische Erzeugnisse
Deza Dipharma DOMO Caproleuna
Donau Carbon Donau Chemie Draslovka
DRT Ecofuel spa Ecogreen Oleochemicals
Ecolab EcoloChem Magyarovar Ecophos
Ediltec EGIS Pharmaceuticals Eigenmann & Veronelli
Electroquimica de Hernani Elementis Emery Oleochemicals
Endura ENI EOC
Ercros Esco (European Salt Company) ESD SIC
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Essemar Esterchem Esteve Química
Eti Soda Eurecat Eurocarb Products
Eurocil Luxembourg S.A. Euroresinas Industrias Quimicas Euro Support Catalysts Group
Euro YserProductos Quimicos Euticals Spa Ewald Gelatine
Fabbrica Italiana Sintetici Faci Fantoni
FeF Chemicals Feracid Feralco
Ferro Fertiberia Finex Oy
Floridienne Chimie Fluorchemie Dohna Fluorsid
Forchem FORESA Formox AB
FRX Polymers Gaba International Gadot Biochemical Industries
Galata Chemicals GmbH Galp Energia SGPS Gaschema
Gattefossé Gelatines Weishardt Gelita
GE Water & Process Technologies Givaudan Glencore Nikkelverk AS
Grace Green Oleo Srl Grillo-Werke
Grillo Zinkoxid Grindeks Habich
Haldor Topsoe Hamm Chemie Hebron
Hellenic Petroleum Group Helsinn Chemicals Hentschke & Sawatzki Chemische Fabrik
Heubach GmbH Hovione FarmaCiencia Hypred
IKA Innovative Kunststoffaufbereitung  
GmbH & CO KG Imerys Fused Minerals Inchemica
I.N.D.I.A Industrie Chimiche S.p.A. Industrial Chemicals Industrial Quimica del Nalón
Industrial Quimica Lasem Industrias Quimicas Asociadas Industrias Químicas del Ebro
Infineum IQESIL ISOCHEM
Italgelatine Italmatch Chemicals IZOCAM
J.M. Huber JACKON Insulation Janssen Pharmaceutica
Johnson & Johnson Johnson Controls Recycling Johnson Matthey Macfarlan Smith
Juncá Gelatines Jungbunzlaue r KAO Corporation
Kerneos Kerry Bioscience KGHM Polska Miedz S.A.
Kilco Limited Kilfrost Killgerm
KLK Emmerich GmbH Klüber Lubrication München SE & Co KG Knauf
Kodak Nederland BV Koppers Europe Koppers Specialty Chemicals
Krems Chemie AG KRKA Kronochem
Kronos International La Seda de Barcelona Laboratoires Anios
Laboratorios Agrochem Laboratorios Miret – Lamirsa Lamberti
Lapi Gelatine Laviosa Chimica Mineraria Lawter BVBA
Lenzing Lerg Liebau Chemie
Liphatech Lodi Group Lonza Group
Lubrico-A Tsakalis Ltd Lukoil Neftochim Bourgas Luresa Resinas S.L.
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Lysoform Dr. Hans Rosemann Marchi Industriale Mare Austria
Mario Pilato Blat Medichem Melamin D.D. Kocevje
Merck Sharp & Dohme MFP Michelin Microban
Milliken Chemical Minafin France Minera de Santa Marta
Minersa Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Company Momentive Performance Materials
Motim Electrocorundum Ltd Nabaltec Nalco Europe
Nanocyl Neste Oil Nordische Oelwerke
Norit Nederland Norzinco Novacarb
Novacap Novacyl Novapex
Novartis Animal health Novozymes Nubiola Pigmentos
Nuova Solmine Nuplex Resins Nyco
Nyrstar OCI Nitrogen Ofichem
Oleochem Oleochimica Italia S.r.l. Oleon
Oltchim Omnova Solutions Omya International
Organic Kimya Netherlands Oxiris Chemicals Oxizinc-Agalsa
PCAS PCC Exol PCC Rokita
PelGar International Penox Pentagon Fine Chemicals
Peter Greven Fett-Chemie Petrochem Carless Pfizer
Phillips 66 Physalys PICA
Piramal Healthcare Plastay Kimya Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S PMC
PKN Orlen Poliya Polyester Industry and Trade Polynt
Polycasa Portovesme PPG Industries
PQ Europe Prayon Precheza
Produits Chimiques De Loos – Chemilyl Prom Chem Promox
Protelor Purolite International PVS Chemicals
Quaker Chemical Quimitécnica Radici Chimica
Rahn Reagens Reagent
Reckitt Benckiser Reichhold Reinert Gruppe
Remondis Rentokil Initial Resindion
Resiquímica – Resinas Quimicas Respol Resinas SA RheinPerchemie
Rich. Steinebach Robinson Brothers Rohner
Roquette Frères Rousselot Rütgers Germany
Sachtleben Bergbau Sachtleben Pigments Sachtleben Wasserchemie
Sadepan Chimica Sanitized Sapec Quimica
SARAS Sasol S.C. Johnson
Schirm GmbH Schill & Seilacher Schülke & Mayr
Scott Bader Company SE Tylose SEKAB
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SEPPIC SERATEC Shin-Etsu Silicones Europe
S.I.C.A.V. SI Group Sidra Wasserchemie
Siegfried Sifavitor Silcarbon Aktivkohle
Silekol SILKEM Silmaco
Silox Sirap Insulation srl SKW Stickstoffwerke Piesteritz
Slovnaft Petrochemicals sr.o. Soda Sanayii Soderec International
S. O.G.I.S. Industria Chimica Songwon International AG Sonneborn RP B.U.
Sopura SPIGANORD Spolana
Spolchemie Stahl International Statoil
Stearinerie Dubois Stepan Stockmeier Chemie
Sulquisa Sun Chemical Swords Laboratories
Syngenta Crop Protection Synthesia Synthite
Synthomer Ltd Synthopol Chemie Talvivaara Mining Company
Taminco Tata Chemicas Europe Tate & Lyle
TCDO Produktions Tereos Syral Tessenderlo Chemie
TFL Ledertechnik Thor TIB Chemicals
TIMAB Industries Tolsa Tosoh Europe
Total France Total Germany Tricat
Trifer Trobas Gelatine Tronox Pigments
Troy Chemical UBE Chemical Europe Ubichem
UMICORE Unger Unión Deriván
United Initiators GmbH & Co KG United Resins Uquifa
Ursa International van Baerle Van Baerle GmbH + Co.
Veolia Water Vereinigte Kreidewerke Dammann KG Victrex Manufacturing Ltd
Vodni Sklo A.S Vopelius Chemie AG Washington Mills Electro Minerals
Weylchem Frankfurt William Blythe Woellner
Worlée Xellia Pharmaceuticals Xstrata Zink
YARA International Zach System S.p.A Zak SA
Zaklady Azotowe Pulawy Zaklady Azotowe w Tarnowie-Moscicach Grupa Azoty Zaklady Chemiczne Police S.A.
Zapi Zea-Sciences Zeochem
ZM Silesia SA Zschimmer Schwarz Mohsdorf
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3. CEPI members (as of September 2014)
Through its 18 member countries (17 European Union members plus Norway) CEPI represents some 520 pulp, paper and board producing 
companies across Europe, ranging from small and medium sized companies to multi-nationals, and 940 paper mills. A list of companies which 
are members of CEPI is not disclosed on their website.
Partners
The Partnership Programme is open to stakeholders in the pulp, and paper or cardboard industry, namely machine and/or chemical suppliers 
with a direct link to paper manufacturing.
Members
Below are the national business federations which are CEPI’s direct members.
Buckman Omya Pöyry
Voith
ACPP – Association of the Czech Pulp and 
Paper Industry
ASPAPEL – Asociación Española de 
Fabricantes de Pasta, Papel y Cartón
ASSOCARTA – Associazione Italiana  
fra gli Industriali della Carta, Cartoni  
e Paste per Carta
AUSTROPAPIER – Vereinigung der 
Österreichischen Papierindustrie CELPA – Associação da Indústria Papeleira
Chamber of Commerce and  
Industry of Slovenia
COBELPA – Association des Fabricants de 
Pâtes, Papier et Cartons de Belgique
COPACEL – Union Française des Industries 
des Cartons, Papiers et Celluloses CPI – Confederation of Paper Industries
FEDPRINT – Federation of the Hungarian 
Printers and Paper Makers FFIF – Finnish Forest Industries Federation Norsk Industri
ROMPAP – The Patronizing Organization 
for Romanian Pulp and Paper Industry
Royal VNP – Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Papier – en kartonfabrieken SFIF – Swedish Forest Industries Federation
SPP – Association of Polish Papermakers VDP – Verband Deutscher Papierfabriken ZCPP SR – Union of Pulp and Paper Industry of the Slovak Republic
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Fédération Belge des Entreprises Electriques et 
Gazières asbl (FEBEG) / 
Federatie van de Belgische Elektriciteits-en 
Gasbedrijven (FEBEG)
SYNERGRID asbl
CROATIA (local name: Hrvatska)
Croatia EURELECTRIC Section – Croatian 
Chamber of Economy
CYPRUS
Electricity Authority of Cyprus
CZECH REPUBLIC









Union Française de l’Electricité (UFE)
GERMANY
Bundesverband der Energie- und 
Wasserwirtschaft e.V. (BDEW)
GREECE




Icelandic Energy & Utilities (SAMORKA)
IRELAND
Electricity Association of Ireland (EAI)
ITALY
Assoelettrica – Associazione nazionale 
delle imprese elettriche
LATVIA
Latvian Association of Power Engineers & 
Energy Constructors (LEEA)
LITHUANIA
Nacionaline Lietuvos Elektros Asociacija
LUXEMBOURG







Polski Komitet Energii Elektrycznej (PKEE)
PORTUGAL
Associação Portuguesa das Empresas do 
Sector Eléctrico (ELECPOR)
SLOVAKIA (Slovak Republic)
Zväzu Zamestnávatel’ov Energetiky Slovenska 
(ZZES)
SLOVENIA
Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, Energy 
Association, EURELECTRIC Section
SPAIN
Asociación Espanola de la Industria 
Eléctrica (UNESA)
SWEDEN
Svensk Energi Swedenergy AB
SWITZERLAND
Verband Schweizerischer 
Elektrizitätsunternehmen (VSE) / Association 





Türkiye Elektrik Sanayi Birligi (TESAB)
UNITED KINGDOM
Energy UK
Energy Networks Association (ENA)
European Affiliate Members
ALBANIA













Jersey Electricity Company Ltd.
Mediterranean Affiliate Members
ALGERIA
Société Nationale de l’Electricité et du Gaz 
(SONELGAZ)
EGYPT
Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC)
EGYPT
Egyptian Electricity Holding Company 
(EEHC)
MOROCCO
Office National de l’Électricité (ONE)
TUNISIA
Société Tunisienne de l’Électricité et du Gaz 
(STEG)
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy22
International Affiliate Members
JAPAN
Central Research Institute of Electric Power 
Industry (CRIEPI)
KAZAKHSTAN






Energy Supply Association Australia Limited 
(ESAA)
CANADA
Canadian Electricity Association (CEA)
CHINA
China Electricity Council (CEC)
JAPAN
IERE – Electric Power Technology Platform
UNITED STATES




ABB Accenture APX Power Spot Exchange
AREVA Burmeister & Wain Scandinavian Contractor A/S Diehl AKO Stiftung & Co. KG
DNV GL – Energy DTEK Energy Insights
Enrichment Technology Company Limited EPEX Spot SE FTI Compass Lexecon
GEN Nederland BV GLEN DIMPLEX IBM
IHS Global Limited Itron Landis+Gyr AG
ORMAZABAL Velatia Pöyry Management Consulting Ltd PricewaterhouseCoopers
Siemens AG Tesla (Europe) Ltd Wärtsilä Corporation
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5. EUROFER members (as of September 2014)
Members
Associated Members
Acciaieria Arvedi S.p.A. Acerinox SA AG der Dillinger Hüttenwerke
Aperam ArcelorMittal Group BSW – Badische Stahlwerke GmbH
Bulgarian Association of the Metallurgical CELSA Group CMC Poland
Deutsche Edelstahlwerke GmbH Duferco Belgium Edelstahl-Vereinigung E.V.
ENXE – Hellenic Steelmakers Union Evraz Vitkovice Steel a.s. Fachverband der Bergwerke und Eisen 
erzeugenden Industrie
Federacciai Federation Française de l'Acier Feralpi Siderurgica S.p.A.
FNsteel Georgsmarienhütte Group Groupement de la Sidérurgie asbl
Halyvourgiki Inc. Hellenic Halyvourgia Hutnictvi Zeleza
ILVA SpA ISD Dunaferr Danube Ironworks Private 
Company Limited by Shares
ISD Huta Czestochowa Sp.z.o.o.
Jernkontoret Lech-Stahlwerke GmbH Liepajas Metalurgs
Lucchini S.p.A. Marienhütte Stahl und Walzwerk GmbH Metallinjalostajat
Metinvest Trametal SpA MVAE – Association of the Hungarian  
Steel Industry
NLMK Europe
Outokumpu Oyj Ovako Group Polish Steel Association
Riva Forni Elettrici SpA Ruukki Saarstahl AG
Salzgitter AG Sidenor SA – Greece Siderurgia Nacional – Empresa  
de Produtos Longos S.A
SIJ Slovenian Steel Group SSAB Group Stahlwerk Thüringen GmbH
Store Steel Tata Steel Europe Ltd ThyssenKrupp AG
Trinecke Zelezarny AS U.S. Steel Kosice UK Steel – EEF
UNESID Spanish Steel Association UniRomSider voestalpine AG
Vorskla Steel Denmark A/S Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl
Colakoglu Metalurji Diler Demir Celik Eregv li Demir ve Çelik Fabrikalari T.A.S
5
.
ICDAS Iskenderun Demir ve Celik ISDEMIR Kremikovtzi AG
Swiss Steel AG TÇÜD – Türkiye Çelik Üreticileri Dernegv i
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6. Eurometaux members (as of September 2014)
National Members
Associate Members
Agoria (Belgium) AFA (Association française de l'Aluminium 
(France)
Association of Finnish Steel & Metal 
Producers, Metallinjalostajat (Finland)
Association Suisse des Métaux  
Précieux (Switzerland)
Assomet (Italy) BAMI (Bulgarian Association of the 
Metallurgical Industry) (Bulgaria)
FEDEM (France) IGMNiR (Polish Economic Chamber / 
Association of Non-Ferrous Metals  
& Recycling)
Johnson Matthey (UK)
Norsk Industri (Federation of Norwegian 
Industries) (Norway)
SveMin (Swedish Association of Mines, 
Mineral & Metal Producers) (Sweden)
Unicobre (Spain)




WKO (Association of the Austrian  
Non-Ferrous Metals Industry) (Austria)
European Non-Ferrous Metals Commodity Associations
EAA (European Aluminium Association) ECI (European Copper Institute) EPMF (European Precious  
Metals Federation)
ILA-Europe (International Lead  
Association Europe)




Alcoa Europe Anglo American Atlantic Copper
Aurubis BHP Billiton Boliden
ECO-BAT Technologies Elkem Eramet
Fesil Finnfjord Hydro
KGHM Polska Miedz Metallo Chimique Norilsk Nickel Finland Oy
Nyrstar Plansee Rio Tinto Alcan
Umicore Vale Inco Wieland Werke
Xstrata Zinc
BeTS (Beryllium Science &  
Technology Association)
CDI (Cobalt Development Institute) EPMA (European Powder 
Metallurgy Association)
Euroalliages EUROBAT (European Storage Battery 
Manufacturers Association)
I2a (International Antimony Association)
IMoA (International  
Molybdenum Association)
LME (London Metal Exchange) RECHARGE (International Association  
for the Promotion & Management of 
Portable Rechargeable Batteries)
Tin Technology Ltd. (ITRI) VANITEC (Vanadium International  
Technical Committee)
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7. FuelsEurope members (as of September 2014)
Members
Alma Petroli Anadarko Petroleum Corporation bp
cepsa Eni S.p.A ERG
ESSAR ExxonMobil galp energia
Gruppo api Gunvor Group H&R Gruppe
Hellenic Petroleum INA INEOS
IPLOM S.p.A Koch Industries Lotos
lukoil lyondellbasell MOL
Motor Oil murco neste oil
nynas OMV Group Orlen
Phillips 66 preem Q8
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8. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers members (as of September 2014)
OGP upstream companies
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC) Addax Petroleum Afren Plc
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation JSOC Bashneft BG Group
BHP Billiton BP plc Cairn Energy
Cairn India Chesapeake Energy Chevron Corporation
CNOOC Limited CNR International ConocoPhillips
Devon Energy Dolphin Energy Ltd DONG Energy A/S
Dragon Oil E.ON Ruhrgas AG eni SpA
ExxonMobil Fairfield Energy GALP Energia, SA
GdF Suez E&P Genel Energy Hess Corporation
Husky Oil Operations Ltd INPEX Corporation Kosmos Energy
Kuwait Oil Company Maersk Olie og Gas AS Marathon Oil Company
MOL plc Murphy Oil Nexen Energy ULC
Noble Energy North Caspian Operating Company (NCOC) OMV
Origin Energy Pan American Energy Papuan Oil Search Ltd
Perenco Holdings Ltd Petróleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras) Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex)
PETRONAS Carigali Sdn Bhd PLUSPETROL SA Premier Oil
PTT Exploration and Production Public 
Company Ltd (PTT EP) Qatar Petroleum
Ras Laffan Liquified Natural Gas  
Company Limited (RasGas)
Repsol RWE Dea AG Sasol
Shell International Exploration  
& Production BV Statoil Suncor
Talisman Energy Inc. Total Tullow Oil
Wintershall Holding GmbH Woodside Energy Ltd Yemen LNG Company Ltd
Zakum Development Company (ZADCO)
Lobbying by Trade Associations on EU Climate Policy27
OGP Associate Members
Baker Hughes Incorporated Schlumberger
National and other associations
American Petroleum Institute (API) Asistencia Recíproca Petrolera Empresarial Latinoamericana (ARPEL)
Association of German Oil & Gas  
Producers (WEG)
ASSOMINERARIA Australian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association
Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP)
Consejo Colombiano de Seguridad (CCS) Energy Institute Insituto Brasileiro de Pétroleo,  Gás e Bioconbustíveis (IBP) 
International Association of Drilling 
Contractors (IADC)
International Association of Geophysical 
Contractors (IAGC)
International Petroleum Industry 
Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA)
Irish Offshore Operators’ Association 
(IOOA)
Netherlands Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Production Association (NOGEPA) Norwegian Oil and Gas
Oil Gas Denmark Oil & Gas UK
